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MARY ANN KING* & SALLY K. FAIRFAX"

Public Accountability and
Conservation Easements: Learning
from the Uniform Conservation
Easement Act Debates
ABSTRACT
In drafting the Uniform Conservation Easement Act, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL) focused on conservation easements as part of a
private ordering system. Doing so did not accurately reflect the
public nature of conservationeasement use at the time, and in the
20 years since the NCCUSL's debates, the need for greaterpublic
accountability for conservation easements has become more
apparent. As Congress ponders restricting the deductibility of
donated easementsfor federal income tax purposes, the land trust
community is reforming its practices to regain public confidence
in itself and its conservation easements. The NCCUSL debates
provide a trove of insights into mechanisms that could be of
significant utility to establishinggreaterpublic accountabilityfor
land trusts and conservationeasements.
I. INTRODUCTION: PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY,
CONSERVATION EASEMENTS, AND THE UNIFORM
CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT DEBATES
In the early 1980s, when the land trust movement was small and
unfamiliar and conservation easements (CEs) were relatively new and
unproven,' the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
*

Mary Ann King is a Ph.D. student in the Department of Environmental Science,

Policy and Management at the University of California, Berkeley.
*
Sally K. Fairfax is Henry J. Vaux Distinguished Professor of Forest Policy in the
Department of Environmental Science, Policy and Management at the University of
California, Berkeley. The authors would like to thank Russell Brenneman, K. King Burnett,
John J. Costonis, Michael Dennis, Shaun Fenlon, Charles Fisher, Jean Hocker, Breena
Holland, Jessica Jay, Nancy A. McLaughlin, Ross D. Netherton, Jessica Owley Lippmann,
Andrea Peterson, Jeff Pidot, Katie Robinson, Carol Rose, William Sellers, and Russ Shay.
This article is dedicated to Judy Gruber.
1.

SALLY K. FAIRFAX Er AL., BUYING NATURE: THE LIMITs OF LAND ACQUISITION AS A

CONSERVATION STRATEGY 1780-2004, at 171, 178-83 (2005) [hereinafter FAIRFAX ET AL.,
BUYING NATURE] (Chapter seven provides an early history of the land trust movement and
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Laws (NCCUSL)2 developed the Uniform Conservation Easement Act
(UCEA). It was a proposal for state legislation intended to strengthen the
reliability of CEs as a conservation tool. The UCEA achieved the
commissioners' most pressing priority: both the UCEA debate and its
adoption in 22 states were critical elements in putting CEs beyond the
reach of problematic common law defenses against enforcement.
However, in "sweeping away" 3 common law concepts that
constrained CEs, the NCCUSL drafting committee also swept away
common law tools of accountability personified by the watchful (or
appurtenant) neighbor. Historically, the neighbor had provided an
informal but useful system of easement recordation, monitoring, and
enforcement. The commissioners limited CE holding to government
entities or charitable organizations and believed that those limitations
would ensure an equivalent degree of accountability. We argue that
4
critical elements of CE accountability have not been effectively replaced.
Moreover, the commissioners left other common law principles in place
(e.g., eminent domain, marketable title) or their application in limbo
(e.g., charitable trust principles). Removing the watchful neighbor while
leaving CEs enmeshed in other elements of the common law has left CEs
in an unpredictable morass of public oversight tools that is not effective,
nor does it provide consistent assurances of adequate public consultation
in land trust programs.

the Land Trust Alliance (LTA), the coordinating mechanism/lobbying arm of the land trust
movement.).
2. See infra Part II.C.
3. The preface to the proposed legislation makes the claim explicitly. See Uniform
Conservation Easement Act (drafted by the NCCUSL, 1981) [hereinafter UCEA],
Commissioners' Prefatory Note 7.
4. McLaughlin advocates a charitable trust interpretation of CEs as a route to
accountability concerning their modification and termination. See Nancy A. McLaughlin,
Rethinking the PerpetualNature of Conservation Easements, 29 HARv. ENVrL. L. REV. 421 (2005)
[hereinafter McLaughlin, Rethinking]. Although we share her accountability concerns, we
are less interested in drawing modification and termination issues into the courts than we
are with drawing public participation into the decision to create an easement and draft its
terms. As easements have become larger, frequently encompassing whole regions such as
the "Northern Forest," dealing with them as a form of local or regional land use planning is
unavoidable. The watchful neighbor is not a proxy for this kind of community
involvement, but by eliminating the requirement of appurtenance and substituting
attorney general and perhaps Internal Revenue Service enforcement of trust principles, the
UCEA also removed the neighbors. See generally FAIRFAX ET AL., BUYING NATURE, supra note
1 (especially chs. 8, 9). For our more enthusiastic treatment of charitable trust principles, see
generally JON A. SOUDER & SALLY K. FAIRFAX, STATE TRUST LANDS (1996) and SALLY K.
FAIRFAX & DARLA GUENZLER, CONSERVATION TRUSTM (2001). We turn directly to the trust

issues that McLaughlin raises in Rethinking, supra, in Part III.C.2, infra.
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In discussing oversight and accountability, the commissioners
viewed CEs as a private ordering system, justifying their decision as
following logically from a view of CEs as a permutation of traditional
servitudes. But many commissioners questioned the private ordering
view:5 some disagreed with the general premise; some agreed with the
premise and advocated for greater control on its use; still others
suggested that the public purpose, infusion of public funds, and
duration of CEs warranted greater public oversight. Many practitioners,
scholars, and interested members of the public have since pondered the
appropriate relationship between public planning and private
transactions and have seen a need for more public involvement in CE
programs. We argue that CEs are much more public than either the
UCEA or land trusts often frame them and that the public nature of CEs
warrants more explicit attention to public accountability than the private
ordering system prescribed by the UCEA provides.
Nevertheless, at the time of the UCEA's drafting, the NCCUSL
view of CEs as tools of private conservation did not raise concern. As one
of the drafters remarked, the "private ordering system.. .would
supplement and assist in carrying forward public programs of great
importance without conflicting with them." 6 Indeed, the private nature
of CEs has been a major part of their charm; they have been embraced as
a private, voluntary, or win-win alternative to regulation that protects
resources while compensating affected landowners. 7 Although the
commissioners do not appear to have anticipated the rapid growth in
land trusts 8 and the use of CEs, the land trust movement's early
phenomenal success appears to have deflected potential challenges to
CEs. The NCCUSL effort to facilitate CE use succeeded and CEs became
5. See generally Gerald Komgold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A Policy
Analysis in the Context of in Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 TEX. L. REV. 433 (1984).
6. Proceedings in Comm. of the Whole, Uniform Conservation and Historic Preservation
Agreements Act, 14 (1979) [hereinafter 1979 Proceedings] (statement of Comm'r Russell L.
Brenneman).
7. See generally Leigh Raymond & Sally K. Fairfax, The "Shift to Privatization" in Land
Conservation: A Cautionary Essay, 42 NAT. RESOURCES J. 599 (2002). John Costonis suggests
that CEs might fit between uncompensated regulations and compensated takings. John J.
Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accommodation Power, in REGULATION V.
COMPENSATION IN LAND USE CONTROL: A RECOMMENDED ACCOMMODATION, A CRITIQUE,

AND AN INTERPRETATION 3 (John J. Costonis et al. eds., 1977).
8. Indeed, the commissioners never used the term "land trust." See infra note 50. We
have also encountered a persistent belief among a small number of old timers in the land
trust movement that The Nature Conservancy (TNC) manipulated the UCEA process to the
disadvantage of smaller groups. We have found no data to support the darker
interpretation. To the contrary, TNC appears to have played a relatively small, informal
role and does not, by any account, appear to have distorted the debate or the outcome in
any particular direction, self-serving or otherwise.
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a common fixture in land acquisition for conservation. The land trust
movement has deployed CEs 9 and enjoyed a long period of extraordinary proliferation and uncritical acclaim.
At the time of the drafting of the UCEA, and even more so in the
20 years following the UCEA debates, the commissioners' emphasis on
private ordering has been confounded by other elements. The federal
government played an active and interested role in the NCCUSL process
and in early CE drafting and enforcement. More recently, beginning with
the early 1990's dot.com fizzle, the bloom came off the private-ordering
peach. 10 As the Washington Post and Congress began asking questions
about business practices" and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) began
looking more closely at charities, at charitable deductions in general, and
at CEs in particular, the debate became a serious threat to standard land
trust activities. The Land Trust Alliance 12 has joined Congress in seeking
ways to assure that CEs and other conservation tools are not used simply
to enhance the wealth of developers or protect the view shed of large
landowners at public expense. 13 The Washington Post articles and
9. CEs account for more than half of land trust acquisitions (in acreage). Land Trust
Alliance, 2003 Land Trust Alliance Census Tables, http://www.lta.org/census/censustables.htm. The other half are divided among private preserves, acquisitions that the land
trusts maintain and manage, and preacquisitions, or flip transactions, in which the land
trust purchases land for subsequent purchase by a government agency. See FAIRFAX Er AL.,
BUYING NATURE, supra note 1, at 206-14.
10. Although states and localities continue to pass bond issues supporting CEs and
land trusts. "In 2004, state and local voters approved 75 percent of the 217 conservation
measures on ballots nationwide, generating $4 billion in new conservation funding and
continuing a rate of success that has been consistent since 1996. Leading the way were
county measures, which enjoyed an almost 80 percent passage rate and accounted for
nearly three quarters of total new conservation funding." See Land Trust Alliance, A
Divided Electorate Finds Common Ground When It Comes to Conservation, http://lta.
org/publicpolicy/landvote2004.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2006).
11. Senate Finance Committee Chairman Charles E. Grassley (R-Iowa) likened selfdealing and other abuses in the nonprofit world to scandals such as Worldcomm and
ENRON. This juxtaposition is not friendly to land trusts and conservation easements. See
Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, News Stories About the Panel, Interim Report Release, http:
/ /www.nonprofitpanel.org/coverage/coverage-interim htmi#post3-2 (last visited June
30,2006).
12. Its evolution is described in FAIRFAX ET AL., BUYING NATURE, supra note 1, ch. 8,
and information is available at Land Trust Alliance, http://www.lta.org/.
13. The LTA spent 14 months drafting a new set of Land Trust Standards and
Practices. See Land Trust Alliance, New Resources Available for Land Trust Standards and
Practicesfrom LTA, http://www.lta.org/sp/ltanet.htm (last visited June 30, 2006). The IRS
has also been at work developing new approaches for auditing conservation easement
claims for tax deductions, which is probably the most persistent and pervasive problem.
Land trusts participate marginally in the process, signing a document in which the
landowner states the value of the easement but technically not certifying that the value is
reasonable. Nancy A. McLaughlin, Increasing the Tax Incentives for Conservation Easement
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congressional inquiries indicate how, in the early twenty-first century, a
long overdue, perhaps post-adolescence, period of public criticism and
14
scrutiny had engulfed land trusts and CEs.
We argue that many of the problems arise from placing CEs
within a private, rather than public, ordering system. Doing so was not
reasonable even as the commissioners debated; it did not reflect the way
CEs were being used at the time, and it did not account for the interest
and participation of federal agencies in the UCEA drafting. 15 Moreover,
it is inappropriate given the way the land trust community operates in
the early twenty-first century. The Washington Post may have directed
the IRS and congressional attention toward questionable business
practices of The Nature Conservancy (TNC), but the ensuing debate on
the tax deductible status of donated CEs has turned on the blending of
public and private and has ripened into a demand for public
accountability across the entire land trust community.
We argue that the NCCUSL's sweeping of the common law and
its conception of CEs as private instruments have contributed to the land
trust movement's current quandary. CEs were in 1980, and remain
today, a combination of public and private leadership, management, and
funding. Although conserved lands are now frequently held in blurred
mosaics of public and private land ownership and management
priorities, 16 they are not well integrated into established forms of public
review, oversight, or land use planning.
Although we are critical of parts of the UCEA, this article uses
the NCCUSL debates as a source of insight for addressing accountability

Donations-A Responsible Approach, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 68-91 [hereinafter McLaughlin,
Increasing]. The IRS is presently investigating more than 48 easement donors and easement
holders, including The Nature Conservancy, suspecting that they have profited "unduly"
from easement transactions. See also Joe Stephens, Alliance Starts Plan to Improve Land Trusts:
Association Moves to Train and Accredit Conservation Organizations, WASH. POST, Apr. 20,
2005, at A8.
14. See Joe Stephens & David B. Ottaway, $420,000 a Year and No-Strings Fund:
Conservancy Underreported President'sPay and Perks of Office, WASH. POST, May 4, 2003, at
A21 [hereinafter Stephens & Ottoway, $420,00 A Year]; Joe Stephens & David B. Ottoway,
How a Bid to Save a Species Came to Grief, WASH. POST, May 5, 2003, at Al; Nonprofit Sells
Scenic Acreage to Allies at a Loss: Buyers Gain Tax Breaks with Few Curbs on Land Use, WASH.
POST, May 6, 2003, at Al. The Washington Post articles are the most famous but not the only
arrows in this quiver. See generally FAIRFAX ET AL., BUYING NATURE, supra note 1, ch. 9. As
one element of that reconsideration, the tax status of CEs is again in doubt. See JOINT
COMM. ON TAX'N, OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES,
JCS-02-05, at 277-87 (2005), availableat http://www.house.gov/jct/s-2-05.pdf.
15. See discussion infra Part II.D.
16. See FAIRFAX ET AL., BUYING NATURE, supra note 1, chs. 8,9.
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issues that threaten 17 both CEs and the land trust movement. We base
our understanding of accountability on Judge Richard Posner's
discussions of the topic and focus on three general elements. First,
accountability includes appropriate tracking of public funds
expenditure. Second, it includes the oversight necessary to ensure that
the goals set forth in statutes and policies are achieved in the most
efficient manner possible. Third, accountability includes assurances that
broad outcomes are being achieved in the most effective and equitable
manner. 18 To these elements we add the necessity of mechanisms that
allow citizens affected by or interested in a decision to know in advance
of the issue and participate in resolving it.
Using these four elements to define accountability, we can look
to the NCCUSL debates as a source of direction. Although they abjured
burdening CEs with mechanisms of bureaucratic oversight, the
commissioners lucidly discussed alternatives for accountability in CE
transactions. The UCEA drafting process is a fruitful source of insight,
particularly with respect to the dissenters' arguments about why CEs
should not be part of a private ordering system, why additional
measures for public accountability were justified and warranted and
how they might be achieved. We thus analyze the UCEA's role as both
part of the problem and a thoughtful source of solutions to the lack of
public accountability in CE transactions.
Our effort to apply the UCEA's debates to current issues
proceeds in five parts. Section II provides background on the UCEA and
the chronology of events that led to its development by the NCCUSL.
Section III discusses what the NCCUSL accomplished, with emphasis on
accountability problems arising from CEs' partial, but continuing,
relationship to the common law. Even though the NCCUSL effort was
not uniformly adopted in all states, it succeeded in removing some of the
common law impediments to CE use. But what was not swept, the
remaining straws of the common law, are also important. The resulting
ineffective interplay between public and private is a serious flaw in the
UCEA proposal.
Section IV briefly summarizes events following the NCCUSL
debates that heightened attention to issues of public accountability; it
17. In early May 2005, the LTA proclaimed on its website, "Congressional Recommendations Threaten Every Land Trust."
18. Paul L. Posner, Accountability Challenges of Third Party Governance 6 (paper
prepared for the 20th Anniversary Structure and Organization of Government Research
Committee of the International Political Science Association, June 15-18, 2004) (on file with
author). See generally Paul L. Posner, Accountability Challenges of Third-Party Government, in
THE TooLs OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE 523 (Lester M. Salamon

ed., 2002).
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chronicles the startling rise of the land trust movement 19 and the current
threats to its continued success. Section V addresses public oversight and
accountability matters left in disarray following the UCEA process. The
NCCUSL debates provide alternatives, carefully thought-out ideas, and
pros and cons regarding CEs and can assist us, with a quarter of a
century's additional experience, in addressing fundamental and
potentially explosive issues of accountability with appropriate dispatch
and a clear intellectual base. Section VI offers our own gloss on those
possibilities.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE NCCUSL AND THE UCEA
A. Introduction
CEs were not new as the NCCUSL began to debate; they had
long been used for conservation purposes. The City of Boston had begun
using easements in the 1890s to protect an "emerald necklace" of parks
around Boston.20 The federal government has been protecting viewsheds
along the Blue Ridge and Natchez Trace Parkways and waterfowl
breeding areas in the upper Missouri Basin with easements since the
1930s. Wisconsin's Great River Road was an early state program relying
heavily on easements, 2 ' and TNC held a growing portfolio of CEs. But
common law principles hostile to CE enforcement were troubling to
private, state, and federal entities using CEs.
Legislation authorizing the acquisition of less-than-fee interests
for conservation and/or historic preservation had been enacted in at
least 29 states before the NCCUSL convened its forum, and at least seven
of those states included private organizations among eligible CE
holders. 22 Massachusetts, for example, assured CE reliability early on -it
19. Dana and Dana have likened the liftoff period in the land trust movement to the
start of the dot.com bubble. See Andrew C. Dana & Susan W. Dana, Rogue Land Trusts,
Abused Conservation Easements and Regulation of the Private Land Trust Movement
(2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
20. GORDON ABBOT, JR., SAVING SPECIAL PLACES: A CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE
TRUSTEES OF RESERVATIONS: PIONEER OF THE LAND TRUST MOVEMENT 19-21 (1993); CYNTHIA
ZArrZEVSKY, FREDERICK LAW OLMSTEAD AND THE BOSTON PARK SYSTEM (1982).
21.
FAIRFAx ET AL., BUYING NATURE, supranote 1, at 181.

22. Charles C. Goetsch, Conservation Restrictions:A Survey, 8 CONN. L. REV. 383 (1976).
Brenneman, in 1979, counted 36. 1979 Proceedings, supra note 6, at 12 (remarks of
Brenneman). Articles that review state statutes prior to the adoption of the UCEA include
Russell L. Brenneman, HistoricPreservationRestrictions:A Sampling of State Statutes, 8 CONN.
L. REV. 231 (1975-1976) [hereinafter Brenneman, A Sampling]; Goetsch, supra; Ross D.
Netherton, Environmental Conservation and Historic Preservation Through Recorded Land-Use
Agreements, 14 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 540 (1979).
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became the first to adopt state legislation in 1956. Amended many times
since then, the initial Massachusetts statute, called the Conservation
Restriction Statute, 23 allowed only government entities to hold CEs. 24
That stricture was lifted in 1969. However, Massachusetts law continues
to require that state officials approve every CE before it can be recorded
with the deed. The Trustees of Reservations acquired its first easement in
1971, a decade before the NCCUSL started work. 25 Thus, the NCCUSL's
slate was not blank. Enough other states had begun to pass legislation
that the NCCUSL perceived a need for uniformity and for national
debate and clarification of basic concepts.
B. Initiating the NCCUSL Effort
The American Bar Association (ABA) proposed a uniform state
CE act to the NCCUSL in 1975,26 but NCCUSL records reveal that similar
suggestions had been made as early as 1966.27 The clarification of state
law authorizing CEs seemed necessary because of a lack of uniformity
across states and because, as we shall reiterate in more detail below, the
common law is generally stacked against enforcement of privately
negotiated CEs. For them to become broadly reliable, it was necessary to
disconnect them from doctrines developed over centuries to prevent a
long-departed former owner from controlling subsequent owners' and
communities' choices. Because property law is generally a question of
state law, each state had to enact legislation to reorient the common law
of property in its own jurisdiction and to define what a CE is, who can
hold one, and whether/how they can be modified, terminated, or
23. The nomenclature regarding conservation easements has always been complex.
24. One of the best articles on the law of conservation easements is Frederico Cheever,
Public Good and Private Magic in the Law of Land Trusts and Conservation Easements: A Happy
Presentand a Troubled Future, 73 DENY. U. L. REv. 1077 (1996).
25. Because perpetual easements were vulnerable prior to the passage of the 1969
Massachusetts statute to protect them from the common law, the few pre-1969 easements
that The Trustees of Reservations did have were called "100 year easements" and the
Trustees renewed them every 30 years. This dodge carved out room for donated
easements, but the Trustees are not totally confident that the "100 year easement" concept
applies to purchased easements. See FAIRFAX ET AL., BUYING NATURE, supra note 1, at 15758.
26. "It is my understanding that this project, from the standpoint of the Conference,
was initiated primarily by authorities of the American Bar Association." See 1979
Proceedings, supra note 6, at 2 (remarks of Comm'r Rupert R. Bullivant). The proposal is
found in Letter from Luther J. Avery, Chairman, Section of Real Property, Probate and
Trust Law, ABA, to Committee on Scope and Program, NCCUSL (May 2, 1975) (on file
with author).
27. Letter from Frank F. Jestrab, Executive Committee, NCCUSL, to the NCCUSL
Committee on Scope and Program (May 19,1966) (on file with author).
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transferred. 28 The ABA proposed in 1975 that the NCCUSL draft a
"Uniform Conservation and Historic Preservation Agreements Act." 29
That proposal grew out of a study funded by the ABA30 and conducted
by the Conservation Law Foundation of New England. 31 Thus, when the
NCCUSL appointed a preliminary drafting committee 32 in 1976, they had
33
plenty of material to consider.
The initial letter from the ABA to the NCCUSL described the
need for the Act in a number of ways: by recognizing the growing use of
"recorded agreements" in the previous 15 years, by citing the benefits
associated with using less-than-fee arrangements rather than purchasing
land in fee simple, by pointing to the success of the British National
Trust in using covenants, 34 by noting that enforceability was key to
eligibility in securing federal matching grants for historic site protection
and IRS tax deductions, and by identifying the growing number of
diverse state statutes on the subject. The ABA and the NCCUSL
35
concluded that uniformity was needed.
28. See Ellen Edge Katz, Conserving the Nation's Heritage Using the Uniform Conservation
Easement Act, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 369 (1986). Because this was done state-by-state in
very different ecological and political circumstances, the state law of easements varies
considerably. Id. For information on which laws were passed and differences among them,
see PROTECTING THE LAND: CONSERVATION EASEMENTS PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE (Julie
Ann Gustanski & Rodrick H. Squires eds., 2000).
29. Letter from Luther J. Avery to Committee, supra note 26.
30. The ABA had organized its own Committee on Historic Preservation and
Easements to address the topic.
31. Netherton, supra note 22. See also Report from Albert B. Wolfe, ABA Advisor to the
NCCUSL Committee, to the ABA Real Property, Probate and Trust Section Officers (Oct.
12, 1979) (on file with author).
32. The drafting committee consists of state commissioners and is appointed by the
NCCUSL Committee on Scope and Program.
33. See generally RUSSELL L. BRENNEMAN, PRIVATE APPROACHES TO THE PRESERVATION
OF OPEN LAND (1967); Brenneman, A Sampling, supra note 22; RUSSELL L. BRENNEMAN,
SHOULD "EASEMENTS" BE USED TO PROTECT NATIONAL HISTORIC LANDMARKS?: A STUDY FOR

THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE (1975) [hereinafter BRENNEMAN, A STUDY FOR THE NATIONAL
PARK SERVICE]; Peter Ames Eveleth, An Appraisal of Techniques to Preserve Open Space, 9
VILLANOVA L. REV. 559 (1964); Goetsch, supra note 22; Jan Z. Krasnowiecki & James C.N.
Paul, The Preservationof Open Space in Metropolitan Areas, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 179 (1961-1962);
Russell R. Sicard, Pursuing Open Space Preservation: The Massachusetts Conservation
Restriction, 4 ENVTL. AFF. 481 (1975); Paul E. Wilson & H. James Winkler II, The Response of
State Legislation to Historic Preservation, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBS. 329 (1971); Note,
Techniques for PreservingOpen Spaces, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1622 (1961-1962).
34. See Lauren Gwin & Sally K. Fairfax, England's National Trust: What Can It Teach
U.S. Land Trusts? 29-31 (prepared for the Land Trust Alliance Rally, Providence, Rhode
Island (Oct. 2004)).
35. The goals of the NCCUSL concerned both predictability and uniformity concerning
CE use. Memorandum from John M. McCabe to Drafting Committee on Uniform
Conservation and Historic Preservation Easements Act, Review Committee, Reporters 6
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The ABA also lamented lawyers' and legislators' lack of
understanding about conservation easements and noted support for the
project from a host of federal organizations, including the Council on
Environmental Quality, the National Park Service, and the Department
of Transportation, and from "national charitable organizations" like TNC
and the National Trust for Historic Preservation. 36 The letter concluded
37
that "few areas of law have more need of... barnacle removal."
The ABA, numerous lawyers, and legislators were summoned to
discuss 38 a familiar, yet new and newly circumscribed, concept. After six
years of debate, the proposed UCEA legislation was approved by the
NCCUSL in 1981 by a vote of 45 to 3.39
C. The NCCUSL
The NCCUSL was an appropriate venue for the task. It was
created by the ABA and maintains a close relationship with it. At the
1889 ABA conference, an address on the benefits of uniform state law
prompted the formation of an ABA committee to investigate the
possibilities further. The NCCUSL grew out of that committee and
became independent of the ABA. It was established as a separate entity
in 189240 as a source of proposed law, a "private legislature" to "promote
(June 12, 1980) (on file with author) (listing possible changes to the 1980 draft of what was
to become the UCEA and providing comments regarding the proposed changes).
Comments accompanying the list of changes noted that a "prime reason to seek uniformity
is to help agencies and organizations with national duties, and powers to award grants-inaid, to administer easement programs with equity between the states." Id.
36. Letter from Luther J. Avery to Committee, supra note 26.
37. Id.
38. Bullivant wrote that one of the purposes of the Act should be to "make it easier for
the average lawyer to draft in this area, without fear of overlooking some common law
problems which might still be hidden in the morass of academic and ancient real property
law." Letter from Rupert R. Bullivant, Chair of Drafting Committee, to John C. Deacon,
President NCCUSL (Nov. 24, 1980) (on file with author).
39. Georgia, Illinois, and Vermont were the three naysayers. The UCEA was approved
by the ABA in 1982.
40. The NCCUSL maintained ties to the ABA, holding its conference concurrently with
the annual ABA meeting until 1962, 90 years after the NCCUSL was established. The
relationship remains close. The ABA is invited to provide an advisor to the special/drafting
committees assigned to each Act and provides some financial assistance to the NCCUSL.
The NCCUSL offers proposed legislation to the ABA for approval. One NCCUSL president
stated,
The maintenance of a close working relationship between the Conference
and the American Bar Association is of the utmost importance. The
Association gives us substantial financial support which we should be
reluctant to lose; but this is by no means its greatest contribution to our
welfare. The imprimatur of the American Bar Association upon
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the principle of uniformity by drafting and proposing specific statutes in
areas of the law where uniformity between the states is desirable." 41 The
NCCUSL is concerned with both uniform legislation-it has drafted over
250 uniform or model acts for state consideration- and uniformity of
interpretation. 42 The NCCUSL considers itself a state organization 43 and
is funded primarily by state appropriations. 44 Commissioners are
members of the bar-attorneys, judges, legislators, legislative staff, and
professors-and are appointed from each state by the governor. The
NCCUSL's template acts are "enacted" or proposed by the Conference
after approval by a majority of states (and no less than 20). Their
proposals do not, however, become law until state legislatures adopt
them, either in whole or in part.
The NCCUSL's earliest work focused on such issues as marriage
and divorce, wills probated in other states, and Sunday as a day of grace
for paying bills, but it is perhaps best known for major, widely adopted
acts like the Uniform Commercial Code. The NCCUSL regularly
addresses issues pertaining to trusts, contracts, and real property, so the
topics of the UCEA were neither unfamiliar to the commissioners nor a
major departure from the wide range of subjects that commissioners

Conference Acts gives them an acceptability with state legislatures and
with the public which they could achieve in no other way....
WALTER P. ARMSTRONG, JR., A CENTURY OF SERVICE: A CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 91 (1991). See also
NCCUSL, History, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=0&
tabid=11 (last visited Mar. 23, 2006). The official name became the NCCUSL in 1915, and
many of its histories repeat that "[w]ith a name like that it must be useful." ARMSTRONG,
supra, at 30.
41. NCCUSL, About NCCUSL: Organization, http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/about
us.asp (last visited July 19, 2006). See also ARMSTRONG, supra note 40; NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, REFERENCE BOOK (published

annually); Allison Dunham, A History of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 233 (1965); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The
Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595 (1994-1995); James J. White,
Ex PropioVigore, 89 MICH.L. REV. 2096 (1991).
42. See generally White, supra note 41. Several scholars and chroniclers of the
organization's history allude to federal-state relations as an underlying theme in the
organization's work-either responding to a fear of increased federal power and preemption of state law or legislating in the absence of federal authority to do so. In the UCEA
case, the impetus was probably the latter. Id.
43. That definition includes the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands.
44. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 20022003 REFERENCE BOOK (2002). "The expenses are apportioned among the States primarily
based upon their population." Id. at 9.
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discuss.45 CEs are situated within state common law, 46 and the common
law defenses available against CEs (as well as the growing body of state
legislation) created uncertainty regarding CE enforceability that the ABA
and NCCUSL considered an obstacle to their efficient use.
D. Who Participated: Federal Involvement and Public-Private Blurring
The group of organizations invited to participate in the UCEA
drafting process is an important indicator of the politics around CEs in
the early years of the land trust movement. Although the NCCUSL is a
"private legislature," outside stakeholders may participate in the
drafting process in three ways. The first is as a reporter, 47 a liaison
between the drafting committee and NCCUSL Committee of the Whole.
Second, outsiders are invited to serve on an advisory committee that
comments on and helps structure the proposed act. Third, outside
individuals or groups may provide comments to the committee or attend
drafting committee meetings and Meetings in Committee of the Whole.
Serving as a reporter or as a member of the advisory committee is
probably the best way for stakeholders to shape a proposal. 48 Although
49
the commissioners were aware of the growing land trust movement,
45. Interview with K. King Burnett, member of NCCUSL Special Committee on the
UCEA and former president, in Salisbury, Md. (July 23,2004).
46. See generally infra Part II.D (a short discussion of federal law as it applies to
conservation easements).
47. The UCEA had two co-reporters, neither of whom were state commissioners, both
of whom were deeply involved in the land trust community at the time. Russell L.
Brenneman had experience in public service with the Connecticut Resources Recovery
Authority and had been a director of the Conservation Law Foundation of New England.
He authored numerous papers and studies on preservation agreements while in private
practice. This included a report to the National Park Service (NPS) that advised the NPS to
"encourage the preparation of a uniform law relating to conservation and historic
preservation easements for consideration by the various state legislatures." BRENNEMAN, A
STUDY FOR THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, supra note 33. John J. Costonis had worked on
transfer of development rights (TDR) while a professor at the New York University School
of Law and his research extended from local historic preservation to the use of
conservation easements and TDRs internationally.
48. See generally NCCUSL Constitution and Bylaws § 2.9(b), available at http://www.
nccusl.org/Update/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=3&tabid=18 (last visited Mar. 22, 2006).
"An advisory member has the privilege of the floor at any annual or special meeting of the
Conference during the terms of the appointment and is eligible to serve as an advisory
member of a Special Committee, but may not vote." Id. Although advisory committee
members do not have a vote in drafting committee decisions, many decisions are made
through discussion and consensus rather than votes.
49, See Interview with Russell Brenneman, co-reporter, NCCUSL Special Committee
on the UCEA, in Hartford, Conn. (July 22,2004); Interview with K. King Burnett, supra note
45; Telephone Interview with Michael Dennis, General Counsel, The Nature Conservancy
(Aug. 24, 2004). Nevertheless, at least two of the drafting committee members (Brenneman
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the land trusts were not deeply involved in the deliberations. Only one
land trust, The Nature Conservancy was invited to participate in the
advisory council.50 Although the NCCUSL received comments from
several major private organizations,51 land trusts were not among the
major participants.
More significantly, given the commissioner's emphasis on
private holding and ordering, the advisory board was dominated by
federal agencies. The Federal Highway Administration, the Bureau of
Outdoor Recreation, the National Park Service (NPS), the Council on
Environmental Quality, the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation
(ACHP),5 2 and the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs of the U.S.
Senate were all invited to participate. The role of federal agencies
extended beyond participation in the advisory committee: both the
NPS53 and the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation s4 had conducted early
studies on the topic, and the Department of Transportation contributed
$25,000 to fund the NCCUSL's work. 55 Employees of the NPS and the

and Burnett) had rather extensive experience working with local, regional, and national
land trusts.
50. Note, however, that early in the movement the larger national and regional
organizations, which we now routinely consider land trusts, did not view themselves as
such. TNC, the Trust for Public Land, and The Trustees believed themselves to be a cut
above the proliferating new organizations. See FAIRFAX ET AL., BUYING NATURE, supra note
1, at 293 n.24. Three other private groups, the Environmental Law Institute, the Conservation Law Foundation of New England, and the Conservation Foundation, were invited
to participate in the discussions, along with two private individuals, a practicing attorney,
and a law professor.
51. Comments were received from the National Trust for Historic Preservation, the
Conservation Law Foundation of New England, and the Trust for Public Land. See Letter
from Ralph W. Benson, General Counsel, Trust for Public Land, to Robert H. Cornell,
Halley, Cornell & Lynch (Feb. 20, 1981).
52. See infra note 83.
53. See BRENNEMAN, A STUDY FOR THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, supra note 33. See also
National Park Service, Scenic Easements (nd), id., app.
54. Norman Williams, Jr., Land Acquisition for Outdoor Recreation-Analysis of
Selected Legal Problems 16 (report to the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review
Commission (1962)). Robert E. Coughlin & Thomas Plaut, The Use of Less-Than-Fee
Acquisition for the Preservationof Open Space (Regional Science Research Institute, Discussion
Paper Series No. 101 (1977)) (based on research conducted for the Bureau of Outdoor
Recreation).
55. The ABA secured funding for the UCEA from the Department of Transportation
(DOT). In the late 1970s, as it was assembling a committee and beginning the UCEA
drafting process, the NCCUSL was experiencing general difficulty securing funding from
states - "four states made no contribution to the Conference or to defraying the expenses of
their commissioners, although they were not averse to adopting uniform acts." In fact, the
only grant that the NCCUSL received that year was for the UCEA. ARMSTRONG, supra note
40, at 114. The DOT also commented on the Act. See, e.g., Memorandum from Lorenzo
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ACHP accepted the invitation to serve on the UCEA advisory
56
committee.
This federal participation indicates that, by the early 1980s,
federal agencies were relying heavily on CEs, indeed on privately held
or negotiated CEs, to implement federal programs.5 7 Where the federal
government acquired easements appurtenant to federal property (e.g.,
scenic easements on the Blue Ridge Parkway), it avoided the common
law challenges faced by easement in gross, as discussed below. But it
became reasonably certain during the UCEA discussions that CEs in
gross conveyed to federal agencies were not likely to be unhinged by
state common law.58 In United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., the

Casanova, Chief Counsel, DOT, to Ross D. Netherton, Contract Manager, DOT (Feb. 22,
1980) (on file with the Natural Resources Journal).
56. For the initial list, see letter from Alicia V. Pond, Executive Secretary, NCCUSL, to
Members of the Special Committee on Uniform Historical Preservation Agreement Act
(Nov. 24, 1976) (on file with the Natural Resources Journal). Co-reporter Brenneman later
added a few more individuals to the list: a trustee for the National Trust for Historic
Preservation (NTHP) General Counsel of the NYC Planning Commission; and an
individual formerly with the American Land Title Association. See Letter from Russell L.
Brenneman to Rupert R. Bullivant, Commissioner, NCCUSL (Jan. 10, 1979). The individuals
that agreed to serve on the committee represented a much smaller subset of that group.
Although we may not have the complete list, we know it included John M. Fowler,
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation; John R. Linton, Nat'l Ass'n of Realtors; Norman
Marcus, Att'y at Law; Ross B. Netherton, ABA Section of Real Prop., Probate, & Trust;
Robert E. Stipe, a trustee for the NTHP (but who did not represent the NTHP on the Special
Committee, Email from Professor Robert E. Stipe to Mary Ann King, Oct. 19, 2004); Glenn
T. Tiedt, NPS; Walter G. Van Dorn, ABA Section of Taxation; Albert B. Wolfe, ABA. See
UCEA, Commissioners' Prefatory Note.
57. FAIRFAX ET AL., BUYING NATURE, supra note 1, chs. 7-9. Brenneman also comments
on the blurring of federal, state, and private: "The conclusiort that in all likelihood federal
law would be applied to validate easements on National Historic Landmarks if they are
held by the National Park Service, however, leaves open the question of the applicable law
in the case of an easement held by a unit of local government or a private charitable
organization...." I BRENNEMAN, A STUDY FOR THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, supra note 33, at
69.
58. Brenneman reiterated this point in his study for the NPS. I BRENNEMAN, A STUDY
FOR THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, supra note 33, at 63-69. There may still be some question
as to the application of state law. See U.S. Army Legal Servs. Agency, USALSA Report:
Environmental Law Division Notes, ARMY LAW. 43-46 (June 2000). See also Karen A. Jordan,
Perpetual Conservation:Accomplishing the Goal Through Preemptive Federal Easement Programs,
43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 401 (1993) (discussing federal preemption in this area). It is also
interesting to note that North Dakota was one of the last states to pass CE legislation. Ohm
et al. attribute this to North Dakota's history as a "frequent battleground over easements
for waterfowl management rights owned by the federal government." Ohm et al.,
Conservation Easements in the Seventh and Eighth Federal Circuits, in PROTECTING THE LAND:
CONSERVATION EASEMENTS PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE, supra note 28, at 313. The North

Dakota easement enabling statute applies only to historic preservation term easements. See
McLaughlin, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 426 n.13.
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Supreme Court concluded that state law did not govern the federal
interests in land,59 but the Court also rejected the government's
argument that "virtually without qualification.. .land acquisition
agreements of the United States should be governed by federally created
federal law." 60 Soon after, a series of cases challenged U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS) wetland easements, which, unlike NPS scenic
easements, were frequently in gross. United States v. Albrecht61 concerned
the validity of waterfowl easements acquired by the FWS under the
Migratory Bird Conservation Act. 62 The defendants argued that North
Dakota law did not authorize the type of in gross servitude held by the
FWS, and that "without [state] statutory authorization the Government
did not have the power to acquire the disputed interest in land." 63 The
court concluded that,
while the determination of North Dakota law in regard to
the validity of the property right conveyed to the United
States would be useful, it is not controlling .... We fully
recognize that laws of real property are usually governed
by the particular states; yet the reasonable property right
conveyed to the United States in this case effectuates an
important national concern... and should not be defeated by
any possible North Dakota law.... [Tihe property right
conveyed to the United States in this case, whether or not
deemed a valid easement or other property right under
North Dakota law, was a valid conveyance under federal
law and vested in the United States the rights as stated
therein.64
The Eighth Circuit therefore concluded that federal, rather than state,
law applied.
However, the legal consequences were far less predictable for
65
state and private entities working in cooperation with federal agencies.
At the first meeting of the NCCUSL commissioners, co-reporter Brenneman observed that

59.
60.
595).
61.
62.
63.
64.

United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 604 (1973).
U.S. Army Legal Servs. Agency, supra note 58, at 44 (citing Little Lake, 412 U.S. at

65.

Those easements are discussed in FAIRFAX ET AL., BUYING NATURE, supra note 1, at

United States v. Albrecht, 496 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1974).
16 U.S.C. § 715, particularly d(2).
Albrecht, 496 F.2d at 909.
Id. at 911 (citation omitted).

92-94, and references cited therein.
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[t]he state of the law in many states prevents an accurate
assessment of the results of a given transaction, and as a
result there is some perturbation in federal programs which
seek to use these approaches on a comprehensive basis,
such as those encouraged by the Historic Preservation Act,
the Federal Highway Administration and the.. .Heritage,
Conservation and Recreation Service of the Department of
66
the Interior.
The FWS, which had extensive experience both in using CEs and in
litigating their status under state law, did not participate in the UCEA
drafting process. 67 Instead, federal aid to highways and federally
supported historic preservation involving land acquisition defined
federal participation in the UCEA.
1. CEs and Highway Beautification
The federal government began giving matching funds to states
for road construction in 1908, and the federal defense "system" of
highways that began in 1952 continued the practice. The 1956 version of
the regularly reauthorized Federal Aid to Highway Act put enough
money on the table to fund a 90 percent federal investment while still
continuing the state grants. Surprisingly, although the Trust for Public
Land now concludes that the "net effect" of post-World War II road and
housing policies was to "explode the metropolis and scatter it across the
countryside," 68 early environmentalists' efforts focused on aesthetics and
billboard control. Encouraged by President Lyndon Johnson's wife, Lady
Bird, "natural beauty" became a major strand of pre-Earth Day
environmentalist attention. 69

66. 1979 Proceedings, supra note 6, at 11-12 (statement of Brenneman).
67. This may have been because the FWS was acquiring and holding wetland
easements rather than relying on states and private organizations. The U.S. Forest Service
was also notably absent from the federal side. Id. Also missing was the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM). Id. This likely reflects the importance of historic preservation in the

NCCUSL discussions. The BLM now appears along with the FWS as the most effective
participant in the easement game. See FAIRFAX ET AL., BUYING NATURE, supranote 1, at 24548.
68. PRESTON L. SCHILLER, TAKING THE HIGH ROAD: PROTECTING OPEN SPACE ALONG
AMERICA'S HIGHWAYS 9 (2002).
69. Environmentalists, government officials, business leaders, and private citizens
attended the White House Conference on Natural Beauty held in May 1965. The topics
suggest the environmental priorities of the day: automobile junkyards, underground
installation of transmission lines, tree-planting, local programs for natural beauty, and
"policies of taxation which would not penalize or discourage conservation and the
preservation of beauty." LBJ for Kids!, America the Beautiful: A Legacy, White House
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Lady Bird's personal crusade culminated in the 1965 Highway
Beautification Act. 70 The Act was a near-total failure at controlling
billboards, 71 perhaps because land acquisition was a key program
element. The federal government was authorized to use eminent domain
to remove unwanted signage. This assured that advertisers would be
compensated, but the ill-thought-out process would have left the federal
government owning very odd patches of relatively useless land. In
response, the Department of Transportation, formed in 1966, encouraged
states to use scenic easements instead 72 and was concerned about their
enforceability.73
2. Protectionof HistoricSites
Federal grants to states for protection of historic sites also have a
long provenance. Although Congress, in the 1935 Historic Sites Act,
specifically intended for the NPS to acquire historic sites with national
significance, 74 NPS staff clearly recognized their limits. The "Park Service
could not deal with the vast number of preservation crises that came up
each year"; it did not have the resources to manage all endangered
properties. 75 Based in part on England's National Trust, Congress
chartered the National Trust for Historic Preservation as a charitable
non-profit in 1949.76 In 1964, a presidential task force recommended a

Conference on Natural Beauty, at http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/lbjforkids/
envirojlegacy.shtm (last visited June 12, 2006).
70. Highway Beautification Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-285, codified at 23 U.S.C. § 131.
71. The title of the best book on the subject suggests that the Act had major flaws:
CHARLES F. FLOYD & PETER J. SHEDD, HIGHWAY BEAUTIFICATION: THE ENVIRONMENTAL
MOVEMENT'S GREATEST FAILURE (1979). More recently, and with the same conclusions, see
Craig J. Albert, Your Ad Goes Here: How the Highway Beautification Act of 1965 Thwarts
Highway Beautification, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 463 (2000). The President was so insistent on
passage of the Act to please his wife that one Senator moved to insert "Lady Bird" in place
of the Secretary of Commerce in the implementation language. FLOYD & SHEDD, supra, at
81.
72. Foger A. Cunningham, Scenic Easements in the Highway Beautification Program, 45
DENV. U.'. REV. 167 (1968).
73. F6ra pre-Highway Beautification Act description of use of highway easements, see
Ross D. N L*THERTON, CONTROL OF HIGHWAY ACCESS 266-70 (1963).
74. BARRY MACKINTOSH, THE HISTORIC SITES SURVEY AND NATIONAL HIsTORIC
LANDMARKS PROGRAM: A HISTORY 17 (1985). In particular, the NPS sought to avoid sites
representing any socially or politically controversial subject. For example, following an
Advisory Board recommendation, a list of places sent in 1937 to the NiS regional offices for
study under the Historic Sites Survey intentionally omitted "all sites of contemporary or
near contemporary nature which might lead to controversial questions." Id. at 81.
75. 2 CHARLES B. HOSMER, JR., PRESERVATION COMES OF AGE: FROM WILLIAMSBURG TO
THE NATIONAL TRUST, 1926-1949, at 811 (1981).
76. Id. at 824-41. For detail on the English system, see Gwin & Fairfax, supra note 34.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 46

program, drafted by NPS staff, to provide federal loans and matching
grants to state and local governments for historic preservation, as well as
tax deductions for private property owners who would participate in the
effort. 77 In 1965, the U.S. Conference of Mayors created a Special
Committee on Historic Preservation. Its report, With Heritage So Rich, led
to passage in 1966 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA).78
The NIPA created the National Register of Historic Places 79 and
authorized grants to the states for preservation. 80 Responsibility for the
Register, as well as the authority to make grants to state and local
governments, was originally given to the NPS. 81 However, the federal
government plays a relatively passive role in the maintenance of the
Register: the state historic preservation offices (SHPOs) do most of the
actual registering.8 2 When tax credits for rehabilitating historic buildings
became available, nominations increased, over-stressing NPS staffing
and funding.8 3 The Register also grew increasingly reliant on state
77. This task force was appointed by President Johnson to report on the preservation
of natural beauty. The findings of the task force were issued as a report to Congress,
LYNDON B. JOHNSON, NATURAL BEAUTY OF OUR COUNTRY: MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF
THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. 89-78 (1965). See also JAMES A. GLASS, THE BEGINNINGS OF A
NEw NATIONAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION PROGRAM, 1957 to 1969, at 7 (1990).
78. Specifically, the Act states that "the historical and cultural foundations of the
Nation should be preserved as a living part of our community life and development in
order to give a sense of orientation to the American people." National Historic Preservation
Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470 (b)(2) (2000). Glass notes that the Johnson administration, the NPS and
the Rains Committee were all seeking legislation for different reasons: "The administration
desired to encourage a popular activity through grants to the states. The NPS wanted to
enhance its position in the preservation movement through a grants-in-aid program. The
Rains Committee was seeking primarily to curb destructive actions by federal agencies."
GLASS, supra note 77, at 17. During 1966, all three worked to have their own objectives
emphasized in legislation.
79. The statute itself did not officially mandate the name; the NPS began referring to
the register by this name in mid-1968, and Congress made it the legal name in the 1980
amendments to the Act. MACKINTOSH, supra note 74, at 38-41.
80. The NHPA also established a federal loan program for those wanting to acquire
and rehabilitate historic properties and for tax relief measures. The 1976 NHPA
amendments established a Historic Preservation Fund (HPF)providing matching grants to
states and the National Trust-money comes from outer continental shelf oil leases. 16
U.S.C. § 470h (2000).
81. MACKINTOSH, supra note 74, at 5.
82. Once the NHPA passed, the NPS sent letters to each state governor requesting that
liaisons for the new program be appointed; these became the SHPOs. GLASS, supra note 77,
at 23. Glass notes that "[a]bout half of them represented state historical commissions or
societies; a third park and recreation departments; and the remainder miscellaneous
entities, such as planning or economic development agencies, tourism divisions, secretary
of state offices, and even a state highway department." Id. (citation omitted).
83. MACKINTOSH, supra note 74, at 63. The NHPA also created the ACHP, which soon
morphed from an inter-agency panel to an independent agency no longer staffed and
supported through the NPS. This change resolved a tension that developed because the
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acquisitions and easements, which readily explains why the NPS84 was
interested in CE enforceability. 85
Indeed, the NCCUSL debates emphasized historic preservation
to a degree that might surprise newcomers to the land trust community.
The term "conservation" was not initially acceptable to some
commissioners concerned primarily with historic preservation. 86 The
final version of the UCEA subsumed historic preservation under
conservation. Historic preservation lost visibility but was not completely
87
obliterated as a CE purpose or use.
In sum, federal participation in UCEA drafting indicates agency
awareness of the degree to which they relied upon state and local
governments and charitable organizations to effectuate federal
programs.8 Both highway and historic preservation programs involved
federally funded easement acquisition. Because state and private actors

ACHP was being staffed by NPS employees yet was also overseeing NPS actions. GLASS,
supra note 77, at 43-44.
84. See also Memorandum from David A. Watts, Acting Assoc. Solicitor, Conservation
& Wildlife, to Assistant Sec'y for Fish & Wildlife & Parks (regarding "Legal considerations
concerning the adoption of a policy of accepting easements over real properties on the
National Register of Historic Places) (n.d.), in II BRENNEMAN, A STUDY FOR THE NATIONAL
PARK SERVICE, supra note 33, app. B, at B-25; Memorandum from Edward Weinberg,
Solicitor, to Sec'y of the Interior (regarding "Authority to accept scenic easements; Historic
Sites Act") (n.d.), in II BRENNEMAN, A STUDY FOR THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, supra note
33, app. B, at B-26.
85. "[The UCEA] seems essential for even administration of federal grant programs."
Letter from Luther J.Avery to Committee, supra note 26, at 2.
86. A few commissioners were hostile to conservation easements and were more willing
to embrace historic preservation: "Iwould suggest to the Committee that they consider two
Acts, one on historic preservation and the other on conservation. Historic preservation by
itself may have a much better chance." 1979 Proceedings, supra note 6, at 22 (remarks of
Comm'r Hershman). Albert Wolff noted that the 1976 IRS code also included historic
preservation under conservation. Letter from Albert B. Wolff, ABA Advisor to the
NCCUSL Drafting Committee, to Chairmen, ABA Entities Concerned with the Proposed
Uniform Conservation Easement Act, and Their Designees (July 27, 1981).
87. UCEA, § 1(1). But historic preservation is not a major element of the land trust
movement. According to the most recent Land Trust Census, only 191 land trusts are
working in the area of historic and cultural preservation. See http://www.lta.org/aboutlt/
census.shtmnl (last visited July 27, 2005).
88. Discussed extensively in FAIRFAX ET AL., BUYING NATURE, supra note 1, especially
ch. 9. "The conclusion that in all likelihood federal law would be applied to validate
easements on National Historic Landmarks if they are held by the National Park Service,
however, leaves open the question of the applicable law in the case of an easement held by
a unit of local government or a private charitable organization...." I BRENNEMAN, A STUDY
FOR THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, supra note 33, at 69.
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were involved, the federal agencies were concerned about the long-term
89
validity of easements acquired under those and similar programs.
E. The Philosophy: CEs as Private Ordering
The UCEA drafters were well positioned to shape the relationship between public and private spheres of land and CE holding, as well
as to define appropriate standards for public participation in CE
transactions. The drafting committee was informed of options for
inserting public accountability and oversight into the UCEA proposal; it
had located existing state statutes9° and debated diverse mechanisms for
achieving public review throughout the life of a CE, from its creation to
its possible termination.91 Committee members discussed the "new set of
problems [that could arise] where you are hybridizing a private ordering
system with public planning and other governmentally expressed
policy." 92 The first draft of the UCEA, for example, included
Massachusetts-like provisions requiring CE approval or filing with
appropriate government units, or a waiting period in which a state
93
agency may file an objection.
Yet, despite the obvious blurring of public and private actors,
interests, and funds inherent in standard CE practice, the NCCUSL
commissioners chose to strengthen CEs as part of a private ordering
system. Although there was not consensus on this issue, many
approached CEs as an element of private property 94 and likened CEs to
conventional common law easements between private parties. Their
view of CEs as permutations of common law easements 95 and of the

89. See infra Part IV.B.4 (regarding UCEA amendment and the relationship between
federal regulatory programs and non-federal easement acquisition, particularly with
regard to exacted CEs).
90. The committee had probably looked at every statute in existence. Brenneman
looked in-depth at three (Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Hampshire). Brenneman, A
Sampling, supra note 22.
91. Most concisely articulated in Russell L. Brenneman, Background, Issues and
Options (Draft 3), written for the Drafting Comnuittee on Uniform Conservation and
Historic Preservation Agreements Act (July 25, 1979) [hereinafter Brenneman, Background,
Issues and Options] (on file with author).
92. 1979 Proceedings,supra note 6, at 41-42 (remarks of Brenneman).
93. Brenneman, Background, Issues and Options, supra note 91, at 8, 9.
94. UCEA, Commissioners' Prefatory Note.
95. They described their task as "assimilating these easements to conventional
easements." Id. 1 6. This was apparently not in conformity with some of the priorities of the
members of the ABA conunittee. See Letter from Russell L. Brenneman to R.R. Bullivant 1
(June 1, 1979).
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UCEA as limited in scope guided the discussion throughout the drafting
96
process.
As the private ordering idea gained traction, the public oversight
provisions disappeared from subsequent drafts. Co-reporter Costonis
stated the NCCUSL approach succinctly:
[I]t's a misconception to assume that this Act creates a
power that doesn't already exist with respect to most
private arrangements regarding restrictions, covenants, and
the like .... It's not the case that we are taking conservation
and preservation easements and elevating them in relation
to other private ordering arrangements at all. We're
basically giving them the same status that other kinds of
private ordering arrangements have. 97
The commissioners rejected many of the additional options and
avenues for accountability suggested in the drafting process.98 They
believed that public oversight would hinder private action because of
bureaucratic red tape, discourage adoption of the statute by state
legislatures, and place additional fiscal and administrative burdens upon
state agencies. 99 They did not want the UCEA to remove common law
impediments to the use of CEs only to place bureaucratic constraints on
streamlined and efficient use of CEs. "Why," Brenneman asked, "should
a public agency be required to give its blessing in order to gain
protection of the statute?"100
The UCEA reflects the expectation that mechanisms were
already in place to ensure that easements were used appropriately for a
public purpose. First, the NCCUSL suggested that codification in state
statute signified a level of state involvement and concern that CEs were
in the public interest: "the very adoption of the Act by a state legislature
facilitates the enforcement of conservation easements serving the public
interest. Other types of easements, real covenants and equitable
servitudes are enforceable, even though their myriads of purposes have
seldom been expressly scrutinized by state legislative bodies." 10 1
96. And, we note, that strategy was not only applied to public accountability but also
to tax provisions, etc. The drafting committee repeatedly emphasized that the Act was
limited in its purposes.
97. Proceedings in Comm. of the Whole, Uniform Conservation and Preservation Easements
Act of the NCCUSL, 77-78 (July 27 & 29, 1980) [hereinafter 1980 Proceedings] (remarks of
Comm'r John J. Costonis).
98. See infra Part III.B.3.
99. UCEA, Commissioners' Prefatory Note 1 7.
100. Letter from Russell L. Brenneman to R.R. Bullivant, supranote 95, at 2.
101. UCEA, Commissioners' Prefatory Note 8.
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Second, the commissioners were aware of the limits of
uniformity and did not want to be so specific as to conflict with existing
state law or constrain states' adoption of appropriate oversight
measures. Although the UCEA carefully did not prevent states from
including provisions regarding CE oversight, most states did not adopt
oversight provisions beyond those that appeared in the UCEA; until the
Washington Post and the IRS became interested, there had been little
public oversight at any level of these only nominally private
transactions. 102
Finally, and most importantly, the NCCUSL believed that, by
limiting the holder to government or charitable organizations, it had
established sufficient oversight mechanisms. Charitable holders, they
believed, were trustworthy enough to exercise discretion in the absence
of public oversight and would not take on obligations and
responsibilities that they could not uphold. 1°3 The commissioners were
confident that the law concerning charitable organizations and levels of
federal and state tax law would prevent abuse. 1°4
In sum, the commissioners saw a distinction between rationalizing the law and facilitating the use of CEs and controlling their specific

102. Not all states have abstained; Virginia, Massachusetts, Colorado, and Montana are
among those states that have adopted provisions for public approval and/or restrictions on
land trusts. See Todd D. Mayo, A Holistic Examination of the Law of Conservation Easements, in
PROTECTrNG THE LAND: CONSERVATION EASEMENTS PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE, supra note
28, at 26. Interestingly, states have generally taken a much more aggressive tack with
regard to water rights acquired by private organizations for instream conservation
purposes. Not only are all transactions subject to public approval (which is characteristic of
all water rights creation, transfers, or changes of use), but also private organizations are
precluded in many states (e.g., Washington, Oregon, Colorado, Montana) from holding the
rights they acquire. In this respect, instream water rights have not found equal footing with
water rights for consumptive use. The Colorado easement enabling statute was amended in
2003 to clarify that a conservation easement may tie water rights to the encumbered land in
certain circumstances. See Mary Ann King, Getting Our Feet Wet: An Introduction to Water
Trusts, 28 HARV. ENVrL. L. REV. 495 (2004); Jack Sterne, Instream Rights & Invisible Hands:
Prospectsfor Private Instream Water Rights in the Northwest, 27 ENVTL. L. 203 (1997). See also
Mary Ann King & Sally K. Fairfax, Beyond Bucks and Acres: Land Acquisition and Water, 83
TEx. L. REv. 1941 (2005).
103. 1979 Proceedings, supra note 6, at 33-34 (remarks of Bullivant).
104. This reliance on charitable organizations has taken on an interesting spin among
colleagues who have assisted us by commenting on earlier versions of this article. Some,
like Nancy McLaughlin, wonder why land trusts should be subject to any less scrutiny than
any other charitable organization. Many NCCUSL commissioners appear to have believed
that CEs should not be subject to any more scrutiny than any other servitude or easement.
Others assert that land trusts should not be subject to more scrutiny than any other
charitable organization. We notice that the public has long had well-defined rights to plan
for community land use. Accountability measures should acknowledge that charitable
arrangements may threaten to erode or preempt democratic planning processes.
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social uses. 10 5 Many commissioners believed the Act should not attempt
to do the latter.
I think the fear that our clarifying what is already the state
of the law might unleash undesirable kinds of groups is
somewhat misplaced, because you already have a private
ordering system in effect. It isn't essentially different from
what we are suggesting here; and all I think we are doing is
not reforming the law, but simply clarifying and restating
it.106

The commissioners sought to encourage the use of CEs as a private
ordering system by providing a simple, streamlined act for consideration
and adoption by the states.
In limiting the scope of the UCEA, the commissioners decided
not to address some key elements of CE policy, including public
accountability and tax implications of CEs, leaving them to the states.
With regard to tax law, the commission decided not to write the UCEA to
match the tax code, asserting that federal tax statutes and regulations
"rigorously define the circumstances under which easement donations
qualify for favorable tax treatment." 1°7 The UCEA may have been
important in ensuring that donated easements would qualify for tax
benefits, 1°8 but it does not address the relationship between easements
and real property assessment or other taxation questions10 9 Public
accountability, the subject of this article, was similarly undefined. One
co-reporter stated, the UCEA "does not deal with systems of public
105. Telephone Interview with Prof. John J. Costonis, Chancellor of the LSU Paul M.
Herbert Law Center (Aug. 26, 2004).
106. 1979 Proceedings, supra note 6, at 46-47 (statement of Costonis).
107. UCEA, Commissioners' Prefatory Note 1 8. Perhaps the fledgling land trust
community did not participate in the NCCUSL process as vigorously as one might have
presumed because it was focused on assuring favorable federal legislation and interpretation regarding tax issues. See generally FAIRFAX ET AL., BUYING NATURE, supra note 1, at
178-83.
108. In the early 1980s, particularly when IRS regulations were either unwritten or
untested and the IRS had not yet weighed in on what would qualify for a deduction, it was
unclear what would qualify and how strictly the "conservation purpose" language of the
1980 Act would be interpreted and reviewed. The Brandywine Conservancy, for example,
went to great lengths to document the conservation and public purposes served by its
easements to support the easement's deductibility. The Conservancy also was an early
leader of a movement to adopt the UCEA in Pennsylvania in order to assure that easements
in gross would be valid and perpetual; both are requirements of tax deductibility. Thus,
although the UCEA was not written to match the tax code, it did support easement legal
validity and perpetuity required by the Code. Interview with William Sellers, Executive
Dir., French & Pickering Creeks Conservation Trust, in Chadds Ford, Pa. (July 27,2004).
109. UCEA, Commissioners' Prefatory Note 11.
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approval for the imposition of restrictions of this kind. It does not deal,
in short, with public ordering systems. It simply deals with the common
law."110
F. Summary
The UCEA emerged from a process that had become familiar to
attorneys over almost a century of cooperation between the NCCUSL
and the ABA. Land trusts were less involved than one might have
predicted, but the importance of CEs to federal programs, for example,
federal highway beautification and historic preservation law, was
unmistakable. The federal agencies' early recognition of their
dependence on state and private partners encouraged greater federal
involvement than perhaps might be expected."' To understand why
federal agencies and others were concerned with the common law
context of CEs, we look in the next section at the cobwebs that NCCUSL
swept away and those that remain.
III. ACCOUNTABILITY, COMMON LAW, AND CES
A. The Common Law Problem-The Alleged Cobwebs
At the first meeting of the NCCUSL Committee of the Whole,
Brenneman identified two major goals: (1) "to sweep away the common
law defenses" to CE enforcement and (2) to "facilitate the creation and
use" of easements by establishing a context that "provides predictable
legal consequences" arising from a CE.112 The common law concerns
were paramount.
American property law inherited the English common law's
hostility to what the UCEA called conservation easements. Part of the
hostility was simply the accumulated weight of minute terminology and

110. 1980 Proceedings, supra note 97, at 5 (statement of Brenneman). We think the
Commissioners did more than merely leave the issue to the states. We argue that their
decision to exclude measures regarding greater public oversight and participation from the
uniform act and to relegate inclusion of those measures to the states complicated efforts to
make CE decisions and holders accountable to the public.
111. See Letter from Luther J. Avery to Committee, supra note 26. One commissioner
stated, "the main purpose of it right now is government acquisition. [The g]overnment is
actively using this device - the federal government - and they need the protection of being
sure that these are valid, as, in most cases, they are paying for them." 1979 Proceedings,
supra note 6, at 45 (statement of Comm'r K. King Burnett).
112. 1979 Proceedings,supra note 6, at 12-13 (statement of Brenneman).
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interpretive distinctions in the "law of servitudes."" 3 CEs were odd new
ducks in a complex body of law regarding easements, servitudes and
covenants," 4 and the combination of the new and the old concepts made
it difficult to assume that the courts would enforce any particular CE5
type agreement, or do so with any predictability."
The underlying issue is the idea of the "dead-hand." At a time
when land was the basic source of wealth, the British common law
restricted private agreements that could "freeze land uses in a
potentially inefficient pattern." 116 Even though the more recently evolved
idea that some property ought to remain undeveloped or "unimproved"

113. A servitude is "[a]n encumbrance consisting in a right to the limited use of a piece
of land without the possession of it; a charge or burden on an estate for another's benefit."
BLAcK's LAW DICIONARY 1400 (8th ed. 2004).
114. Dukeminier and Krier remind us that modem servitudes (generally, a right to
affect someone else's use of their own land, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY:
SERVITUDES §§ 1.6 & 7.11 (1998), can be divided into easements (a limited right to use the
land) and covenants (a promise regarding the use of land). Covenants can be enforced at
law (real covenants) or in equity (equitable servitudes). There is a long story behind these
terms and many complications that we will try not to explore. According to Dukeminier
and Krier,
[w]hen easements were hedged in during the Industrial Revolution by
judges who regarded them as interfering with marketability, landowners
sought enforcement in the law courts of promissory agreements
(covenants) against successors to the promisor's land. But the law courts,
ever jealous of fetters on land, threw up roadblocks against these
"covenants running with the land." Finally, turning to equity, landowners
found a more sympathetic ear. The chancellor began to enforce restrictive
covenants, which came to be known as equitable servitudes. The law of
servitudes thus is a study of how the tides of urbanization and the
demands of the market for efficient control of externalities swept around
the artificial barriers limiting one form of servitude and forced courts to
develop other forms.
JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 781 (5th ed. 2002). The authors go on to
describe the resulting law as "disorderly." Id. at 782. Hearty souls who have not benefited
from a property law course may enjoy Private Land Use Controls: The Law of Servitudes, id.
ch. 10.
115. Gerald Korngold, supra note 5, at 436-37, is among those who argue that using the
easement terminology in discussing conservation easements is incorrect (CEs are not
easements) and is likely to cause confusion when the contracts are interpreted by judges
steeped in the common law of property. See also Antony W. Dnes & Dean Lueck, Common
Law, Statute Law and the Birth of the Conservation Easement (prepared for the Property
and Environment Research Center's 14th Political Economy Forum, Private Land
Conservation: Institutions and Instruments, Big Sky, Montana, Dec. 5-8, 2002).
We are grateful to Professor Andrea Peterson for her help, discussion, and reading
assignments on this topic.
116. Andrew Dana & Michael Ramsey, Conservation Easements and the Common Law, 8
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 2, 24-25 (1989).
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is widely accepted," 7 the terminology and concerns of the common law
were a serious barrier to widespread use of easements as durable tools of
conservation. 118 CEs are a problem because one landowner's preferences,
if perpetuated over time, could become impediments on the free market
in land. The dead hand also acts politically: a landowner's commitments
trump not only the land market, but also future generations' ability to
adopt plans and regulations suitable to their own priorities.
The cobwebs that the NCCUSL swept away were specifically
related to notions of positive and negative, appurtenant, and in gross
easements." 9 The common law has historically allowed a landowner to
grant positive rights in land-an individual, for example, may acquire a
right to cross a neighbor's property to access a land locked or difficult to
reach parcel. But being a neighbor mattered: the holder of the nonpossessory interest or easement typically had to own land in the area, or be
appurtenantto (or touch and concern) the eased land. All of that was well
accepted centuries ago. However, easements that limit the landowner's
use of her own land for the benefit of the general public or an individual
rather than a land owning neighbor-what was called a negative
easement in gross - were not readily enforcable under common law.120
117. Alexander R. Arpad, Private Transactions, Public Benefits, and Perpetual Control over
the Use of Real Property: Interpreting Conservation Easements as Charitable Trusts, 37 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 91, 100 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
118. Some authors have suggested that the common law of servitudes is not only hostile
to CEs but could also be "hazardous to your health":
The law in this area is an unspeakable quagmire. The intrepid soul who
ventures into this formidable wilderness never emerges unscarred. Some,
the smarter ones, quickly turn back to take up something easier like the
income taxation of trusts and estates. Others, having lost their way, plunge
on and after weeks of effort emerge not far from where they began, clearly
the worse for wear. On looking back they see the trail they thought they
broke obscured with foul smelling waters and noxious weeds. Few
willingly take up the challenge again.
EDWARD H. RABIN, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN REAL PROPERTY LAW 489 (1974) (quoted in

Susan F. French, Toward a Modem Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1261, 1261 n.1 (1982)). But we should also be clear that there was a rationale behind
the impediments that arose to negative easements in gross: an appurtenant landowner
served an important function in being aware of and concerned about an easement,
particularly in the absence of adequate recordation systems. And concerns about CE
recording have not disappeared. See infra Parts III.B.3 ("Out with the Interested Neighbor")
and V.C.3 ("Issues that Provide Room for Everybody -Even Academic Researchers"). This
is also echoed in Dnes and Lueck's efforts to find an economic logic to the evolution of the
common law of servitudes. Dnes & Lueck, supra note 115.
119. UCEA, Commissioners' Prefatory Note 17.
120. Cheever, supra note 24, at 1080. Except for one of the four types recognized by
common law: light, air, and subjacent or lateral support or for the flow of an artificial
stream. But there was some indication at the time of the UCEA's drafting that lack of
appurtenance would not necessarily render a servitude invalid. In early communications
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Nor did the common law generally recognize conservation or historic
preservation as a valid purpose for a negative easement- another
potential defense against CE enforceability. Thus, in limiting common
law defenses to CEs, the UCEA expanded both who could hold a CE and
CE purposes.
B. Sweeping the Cobwebs12
1. Expanding Categoriesof Eligible Holders
In removing defenses against easements in gross, namely by
removing common law requirements for appurtenance,
the
commissioners were redefining the scope of eligible CE holders. They
sought to open CE holding to charitable organizations that did not own
appurtenant land. 122 At the time the NCCUSL debated, only seven of the
29 states that had enacted some form of CE legislation recognized nongovernmental organizations as eligible holders. The commissioners
expanded the notion of who could hold a CE from government entities
to include charities. 123 In its most obvious nod to issues of public

about the UCEA, Allan Rodgers and Albert Wolfe of the ABA suggest that many cities had
engaged in federal urban renewal programs with "restrictive schemes" that were
considered enforceable without appurtenant land. Allan G. Rodgers & Albert B. Wolfe,
"Some Legal and Policy Questions" Re a Proposed Uniform Conservation and PreservationAct 3-4
(1976) (prepared for the NCCUSL Drafting Committee). "[Blut not until the blanketing of
the country with renewal authorities were state courts put into the position that they could
not require ownership of appurtenant land for enforcement, without thereby undermining
a major federal program." Id. at 4. The IRS rulings "supporting deductibility of donations
of such interests.. .gave further seal of legal respectability." Id.
121. The commissioners sought to identify common law defenses against conservation
easement and to "negat[e] their use in actions to enforce conservation or preservation
easements." UCEA § 4 cmt. They did so in section 4 of the UCEA, which states:
A conservation easement is valid even though: (1) it is not appurtenant to
an interest in real property; (2) it can be or has been assigned to another
holder; (3) it is not of a character that has been recognized traditionally at
common law; (4) it imposes a negative burden; (5) it imposes affirmative
obligations upon the owner of an interest in the burdened property or
upon the holder; (6) the benefit does not touch or concern real property; or
(7) there is no privity of estate or of contract.
Id. § 4.
122. McLaughlin notes that until recently it was common practice for land trusts in
Wyoming to acquire a small parcel of appurtenant land. Interview with Nancy A.
McLaughlin (Aug. 6,2005).
123. California has recently added Indian tribes to the list of eligible CE holders.
California Senate Bill 18 includes two categories: (1) "a federally recognized California
Native American tribe" and (2) "a nonfederally recognized California Native American
tribe that is on the contact list maintained by the Native American Heritage Commission."
2004 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 905 (Deering).
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accountability, the commissioners limited holders to "charitable
organization[s] having an interest in the subject matter." 124 The prefatory
note is not, however, particularly restrictive regarding easement holders.
More restrictive alternatives were suggested by members of the drafting
committee, for example, restricting the holders to charities "having as a
primary purpose the subject matter of the restriction." 12
The UCEA addressed accountability only indirectly. 126 The
commissioners relied on the public face of private charities. They
reasoned that federal and state law authorizing charitable organizations
provides some measure of accountability. 127 Drafters were also confident
that charitable organizations would have some "self-governing
restraints." 128 They reasoned that neither government agencies nor
charitable
organizations
were
likely
to
accept
easements
indiscriminately. Finally, Americans have long regarded private charities
as sound participants in health, education, and many other public

124. UCEA, Commissioners' Prefatory Note
3. The committee considered including
private individuals as eligible holders but decided against it. 1979 Proceedings,supra note 6,
at 26 (statement of Bullivant). The charitable organizations category was defined in section
1(2)(ii) of the Act as
a charitable corporation, charitable association, or charitable trust, the
purposes or powers of which include retaining or protecting the natural,
scenic, or open-space values of real property, assuring the availability of
real property for agricultural, forest, recreational, or open-space use,
protecting natural resources, maintaining or enhancing air or water
quality, or preserving the historical, architectural, archaeological, or
cultural aspects of real property.
UCEA § 1(2)(ii). The Restatement (Third) of Property suggests that conservation easements
granted to private individuals function in the same way as other easements but without the
special treatment that conservation easements might receive. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROPERTY § 1.6(a) cmt. (1998).
125. The new Wyoming statute, for example, provides that a charitable easement holder
must have as a primary purpose or power "retaining or protecting natural, scenic, or open
space values of real property, assuring its availability for agricultural, forest, recreational or
open space use, protecting natural resources, maintaining or enhancing air or water
quality, or preserving the historical, architectural, archeological or cultural aspects of real
property." UCEA, WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-1-201 to 34-1-207 (2005).
126. See 1979 Proceedings,supra note 6, at 33-34 (statement of Bullivant).
127. In which they were correct, as the land trust movement is now learning. See U.S.
Dep't of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Serv., Exemption Requirements, http://www.irs.gov/
chaities/charitable/article/0,,id-96099,00.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2006) (discussing I.R.C. §
501(c)(3) (2000)). See also U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., IRS PUB.
557, TAX EXEMPT STATUS FOR YOUR ORGANIZATION, (Rev. Mar. 2005). Or, for a brief
rundown, see FAIRFAX & GUENZLER, supra note 4, at 15-16.
128. 1980 Proceedings, supra note 97, at 79 (statement of Costonis).
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policies.12 9 Thus, as they expanded the categories of eligible CE holders,
many commissioners did not view their deference to charities as
130
radical.
2. The Purpose of a CE
The other key element of NCCUSL cobweb sweeping was to free
the CE from the common law's narrowness of purpose and insistence
that negative constraints on the fee holder were generally unacceptable.
The purposes of a CE include "retaining or protecting the natural, scenic,
or open-space values of real property, assuring the availability of real
property for agricultural, forest, recreational, or open-space use,
protecting natural resources, maintaining or enhancing air or water
quality, or preserving the historical, architectural, archaeological, or
3
cultural aspects of real property."1
The UCEA ensured that a CE can
impose more diverse restrictions on the fee holder than a traditional
common law easement.
3. Out with the InterestedNeighbor
To expand the eligible holders and purposes, the commissioners
sacrificed the watchful neighbor, with costs, as noted above, for record
keeping, monitoring, and enforcement.
Record Keeping: The UCEA provides no special provision for
recording CEs except that the CE holder must accept the easement in

129. See Lester M. Salamon, Third-Party Government: Rise of Third-Party Government, 16
THE BUREAUCRAT, Summer 1987, at 27. See also LESTER M. SALAMON, PARTNERS IN PUBLIC
SERVICE: GOVERNMENT-NONPROFIT RELATIONS IN THE MODERN WELFARE STATE (1995).

130.

According to the Commissioners,
the American legal system generally regards private ordering of property
relationships as sound public policy. Absent conflict with constitutional or
statutory requirements, conveyances of fee or non-possessory interests by
and among private entities is the norm, rather than the exception, in the
United States. By eliminating certain outmoded easement impediments
which are largely attributable to the absence of a land title recordation
system in England centuries earlier, the Act advances the values implicit
in this norm.
UCEA, Commissioners' Prefatory Note 8.
131. Id. § 1(2)(ii); Brenneman, Background, Issues and Options, supra note 91, at 6-7
(discussing how charitable purposes may change). A period piece, the UCEA does not
mention wildlife, habitat, or endangered species although the conunissioners contemplated
that the uses that society would define as charitable and as conservation may change. See
Letter from Robert H. Cornell to R.R. Bullivant, Esq. (Oct. 9, 1980) (considering whether it
might be appropriate to consider solar energy as a conservation easement purpose);
FAIRFAX ET AL., BUYING NATURE, supra note 1, chs. 6-9 (discussing changing conservation
goals over the last half century).
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writing. This was designed to protect easement holders from unwanted
donations. 132 Hence, CEs are recorded as any other interest in land. Some
commissioners emphasized the import of easement recordation,
reminding the commissioners that the "cobwebs" of the common law
and historic objections to easements in gross were intended to ensure
that servitudes were not lost because of ineffectual recording systems,
particularly if an appurtenant landowner was not present to remember.
In this respect, the watchful neighbor served an important role in
keeping track of and monitoring an easement. 133 One ABA advisor noted
that "[t]he present draft does not specifically require recordation....
Recordation is of significant practical importance, however, in meeting
the common law's traditional concern that interests in gross may be
easily overlooked and thus become hidden clouds on title." 134
Another advisor recommended "anti-abuse provisions," 135
including mandating the
recording and distribution of copies to appropriate public
officials sufficiently concerned to keep their own
geographic indexes; requiring identification of burdened
land by tax sheet and lot number, or enclosing latitude and
longitude or other grid cell, to facilitate such indexing;
index maps designed to accommodate public utility line
easements as well as conservation ones...; and geographic
indexes of all public orders affecting particular parcels such

132. The Act specifies that the conservation easement is not valid without the written
acceptance of the holder. The drafters were concerned that at common law it was possible
to convey property without the knowledge or consent of the recipient, as in a will.
Recognizing that acceptance of conservation easements could give rise to obligations upon
the holder not necessarily present with a traditional common law easement, the
commissioners were persuaded to include a provision to protect the holders from
unwanted donations. As the Commissioners' Comment for section 2 states, "Conservation
and preservation organizations using easement programs have indicated a concern that
instruments purporting to impose affirmative obligations on the holder may be unilaterally
executed by grantors and recorded without notice to or acceptance by the holder ostensibly
responsible for the performance of the affirmative obligations." UCEA § 2, Comment 2.
133. We are grateful to our colleague Carol Rose for pounding on us about the
interested neighbor. We hope we have it right now.
134. Letter from Ross Netherton, Chairman ABA Comm. on Historic Preservation &
Easement, to Chairman & Members of the ABA Real Prop. Div. Subcouncil 4 (June 12,
1980). McLaughlin notes that many state easement-enabling statutes require that a
conservation easement be recorded in the local property records to be valid, and, for all
practical purposes, so do the IRS regulations under section 170(h). See McLaughlin,
Rethinking, supra note 4, at 494 n.244.
135. Letter from Albert B. Wolfe to Chairmen, supra note 86, at 3.
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as the English have been using successfully for more than
36
half a century .... 1
Some commentators recommended establishing databases or
indexes to facilitate CE location and tracking. 137 Beyond that, a recording
process, dissenting commissioners asserted, could provide at least two
additional benefits. First, recording would increase public notice and
awareness of a CE. Second, recording could provide an occasion for
review and perhaps public comment, "assuring that private
arrangements are bona fide and compatible with local master plans of
community
development
or
special
conservation/preservation
programs." 13 Others argued, more specifically, that a "fundamental
restraint upon future land use" like a CE required "the involvement of
those governmental authorities responsible for record-keeping, planning
and certifying that the transaction serves a public ('charitable')
139
purpose."
The commissioners' liveliest discussions concerned the role of
planning or zoning commissions in CE creation, amendment, and
termination, and the relationship between CEs and land use planning.
As one commissioner stated:

136. Memorandum from Albert B. Wolfe, ABA Advisor to the NCCUSL Drafting
Comm., to Chairmen, ABA Entities Concerned with Approval of the UCEA as being
submitted to the House of Delegates at their Mid-Winter Meeting, & Designees of such
Chairmen 3 (Nov. 25, 1981) (on file with author). See also Gwin & Fairfax, supra note 34
(National Trust land protection programs seem more effective than American ones, they
argued, in part because effective national land use planning mechanisms minimize the
need to buy land or interests in land in order to prevent urban sprawl.)
137. UCEA § 2(a). See Memorandum from John McCabe to Drafting Committee, supra
note 35 (discussing alternatives in recording, such as geographic indexing, that would
make conservation easements more easily identifiable).
Governmental agencies interested in making use of easements may well be
loath to support enactments unless some reasonable way is found to avoid
loss of interests if a governmental clerk 30 years hence fails to file claim of
notice, and name the owners. Some way of keeping track of conservation
and preservation easements by location, as in case of public utility
easements, with maps filed at Registries, say be ever[y] ten years, could
coordinate the two Acts.
Letter from Albert B. Wolfe to John C. Deacon, President, NCCUSL 6 (Apr. 20, 1980) (on file
with author).
138. Letter from Ross Netherton to Chairman and Members, supra note 134, at 3-4. Note
that California has enacted a supplemental recordation statute that requires the registrar to
maintain, "within the existing indexing system, a comprehensive index of conservation
easements and Notice of Conservation Easements on land within that county." CAL. GOVT.
CODE § 27255(a) (West 2006).
139. Brenneman, Background, Issues and Options, supra note 91, at 8.
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While I sympathize with your point that an "approving
agency" is not desirable, I am also aware of the great
pressures in most states in governmental control of all
types of local planning and development. I think there is a
valid argument that some type of public approval is
necessary in order that agreements falling under the
proposed Act will mesh with existing local development
140
regulations and plans.
Ultimately, provisions for recording CEs beyond those placed on
other servitudes were not included in the UCEA, nor was any process
that subjected them to direct public discussion, review, or approval.141 In
removing some of the barriers to easements in gross, however, the
NCCUSL eliminated the informal recording and monitoring system
personified by the watchful neighbor and abjured replacing it with
142
additional recording requirements that might burden the use of CEs.
We argue that the commissioners would have been justified in, and
indeed the public nature of CEs now demands, establishing even more
comprehensive requirements for recording CEs.
Monitoring- Incredibly, given the attention paid to easement
monitoring in the land trust community during the 1990s, 14 3 the UCEA
does not even use the term. The Act does not, the Comment notes,
"impose restrictions or affirmative duties" on either the fee holder or the
easement holder. Rather, it "merely" allows the parties to make
whatever arrangements seem appropriate.'" Thus, the watchful
neighbor's role in monitoring the easement evaporated in the transition
from the common law to statute.
Enforcement-The commissioners viewed the issue of "who can
enforce" a CE with the same private ordering glasses that colored
140. Letter from R.R. Bullivant to Russell L. Brenneman 2 (June 7,1979).
141. 1980 Proceedings,supranote 97, at 76 (remarks of Bullivant).
142. FAIRFAX Er AL., BUYING NATURE, supra note 1, at 268-69. See Darla Lynn Guenzler,
Using Conservation Easements to Achieve Regulatory Objectives (2004) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley). See also Jessica Owley Lippmann,
Exacted Conservation Easements (2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
California, Berkeley) [hereinafter Owley Lippmann, Exacted CEs]; Jessica Owley
Lippmann, Exacted Conservation Easements: The Hard Case of Endangered Species Protection, 19
J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 293 (2004) [hereinafter Owley Lippmann, ECEs: The Hard Case].
143.

DARLA GUENZLER, ENSURING THE PROMISE OF CONSERVATION EASEMENTS (1999);

Jessica E. Jay, Land Trust Risk Management of Legal Defense and Enforcement of Conservation
Easements: Potential Solutions, 6 ENvTL. LAW. 441 (2000); Melissa K. Thompson & Jessica E.
Jay, An Examination of Court Opinions on the Enforcement and Defense of Conservation
Easements and Other Conservation and Preservation Tools: Themes and Approaches to Date, 78
DENY. U. L. REV. 373 (2001).
144. UCEA, Commissioners' Prefatory Note 2.
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everything else. Section 3 identifies four categories of persons who may
bring actions to "affect[] a conservation easement," which includes not
only enforcing, but also modifying and terminating a CE.145 The
categories include not only the holder of the CE and the owner of the
underlying fee land, but also parties identified by the grantor and holder
at the time of the conveyance. 146 The UCEA refers to the fourth category
of persons as a "person authorized by other law." Early drafts
specifically authorized the state attorney to become involved, but
inclusion of the attorney general (AG) was hotly debated. The
commissioners' comments on the UCEA state that the Act recognizes
that the other applicable law may create standing in other persons, such
as the AG, who could have standing in her capacity as supervisor of
147
charitable trusts.
Absent the commissioners' preoccupation with adopting a
private ordering system, it is not clear why those party to a CE designed
to serve the public interest ought to be able to change it. But one
commissioner confessed to being "bothered" in the other direction by the
"standing to enforce provision.. .which goes way beyond the common
law. The attorney general, for example, can participate in a modification
proceeding, as I read it, without the consent of anyone else."1 4s
The UCEA reflects this confusion in that it does not mention the
AG. Initially, the act included the AG specifically, but some
commissioners believed that mentioning the AG in the Act might signal
their acceptance of charitable trust law in CE enforcement and
modification, and the AG was removed and relegated to the notes. The
Chair of the UCEA Committee, Bullivant, explained the rationale for
mentioning the AG at all: he might represent one of the public entities

145. UCEA § 3(a)(1)-(4). See also Sheila S. Asher, Termination and Modification of
Conservation Easements (n.d.) (document found in the NCCUSL files). All three elements
have become hotly debated topics within the land trust community. The 2005 LTA Rally
included well-attended debates, particularly on modifying and terminating. See, e.g.,
Andrew C. Dana & Nancy A. McLaughlin, Extinguishments of Conservation Easements
(Advanced Legal Roundtable, National Land Conservation Conference, Oct. 15, 2005,
Madison, Wis.).
146. UCEA §§ 1(3),3(a)(3).
147. Id. § 3(4). Most obviously, the AG might become involved under charitable trust
law, discussed below at Part III.C.l.b. See also Jessica E. Jay, Third-Party Enforcement of
Conservation Easements, 29 VT. L. REv. 757, 776 (2005). Land trusts generally have deep
concerns about any third-party enforcement. They conclude correctly that they cannot
count on attorneys general to help them when they need help, or to stay out when they do
not want to pursue issues in court. See id.; McLaughlin, Increasing, supra note 13;
McLaughlin, Rethinking, supranote 4.
148. 1980 Proceedings,supra note 97, at 108 (remarks of Comn'r Allison Dunham).
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involved. 149 But another commissioner observed perspicaciously that the
result was confusing: relegating mention of the AG to the comments
muddied the issue on the applicability of charitable trust law to the
easement context. The result did not clearly preclude "charitable trust
[law] from the provisions of the enforcement mechanism, which leaves
uncertain what is a charitable trust." 150 We agree. The result remains illdefined. We make no argument that the watchful neighbor had ever
played an important role in a public ordering system. However, without
the watchful neighbor, and with the role of charitable trust doctrine
uncertain, problems of accountability for CEs were profoundly
complicated.151
4. What's In a Name?
Having extracted the CE from some common law cobwebs, the
commissioners decided, after some debate, to call their new element of
property a conservation easement. At the time of the NCCUSL debates,
CEs were confused by the proliferation of terms that different groups
and states were using to describe what are now generally called
conservation easements. 152 Massachusetts, as noted above, called them
conservation restrictions; 5 3 others called them recorded land use

149.

Id. at 158 (remarks of Bullivant). Bullivant noted further:
the historic concern with and obligations concerning a charitable
relationship of some kind, and many of these relationships where the
government or governmental agency is not a grantee will involve
charitable considerations where the attorney general has duties and
certainly a legitimate interest.
That is the reason, primarily, for placing him in this provision, which
involves either modification or termination.

Id.
150. 1980 Proceedings, supra note 97, at 108 (remarks of Dunham). Others have urged us
to ignore the green curtain that the AG was placed behind, asserting that the charitable
trust doctrine clearly applies.
151. The confusion between land trusts and charitable trusts is significant enough that
in Michigan the AG has ruled that charitable organizations holding conservation easements
cannot use the term "trust" in their name. Hence, Michigan organizations tend toward
names like "conservancy," "association," or "foundation." See FAIRFAX & GUENZLER, supra
note 4, at 21-22.
152. One letter attempted to compile the language used in the state statutes and found
15 different terms for what we might now understand to be a conservation easement.
"Preservation restriction" and "conservation easement" were the most commonly used.
Memorandum from Paula Craighead, Greater Portland Landmarks, Inc., to Ross D.
Netherton and the Comm. on Historic Preservation & Easements, at app. A (Feb. 25, 1980).
153. Which did not further the commissioners' effort to establish conservation
easements as interests in land.
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agreements or land use restriction easements (LUREs).' 4 As a result, it
was difficult to talk clearly and consistently across jurisdictions. 155 The
UCEA nailed the CE terminology to the courthouse door, at least
15 6
temporarily.
Again the commissioners debated. The title "easement" was not
an instantly acceptable term. The UCEA drafting committee and
commissioners were aware of issues later raised in a pivotal article by
Gerald Korngold: naming the instrument identifies the body of law that
would govern interpretation of the instrument. He warned that using the
term "easement" to label a "conservation interest" was risky. It "could
lead an uncritical decision maker to a quick and rigid result without the
157
necessary policy analysis."
The UCEA considered that possibility, but the result reflects an
opposite impulse: the majority commissioners' efforts to "go back to the
source" of the common law servitudes and to expand the idea of an
easement. 158 The UCEA states that, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in

154. See Lauri DeBrie Thanheiser, The Allure of a LURE: Proposed Federal Land Use
Restriction Easements in Remediation of ContaminatedProperty, 24 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 271
(1997). A 1977 ABA report called them "recorded land-use agreements." See ABA, Comm.
on Historic Preservation & Easements, Section of Real Prop., Probate & Trust Law,
Environmental Protection Through Recorded Land-Use Agreements (Mar. 1977); THIRD
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW: PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS (2005)
(referring to them as "conservation servitudes").
155. Brenneman expressed his own confusion:
It bothers me... to call an "agreement" a "right" which then becomes an
"interest in land." In the past, I have favored the use of the word
"restriction" over the word "easement" because the latter carried with it
unwanted history and concepts. However, I grant that "restriction" does
not quite carry the day either because we are interested in affirmative
"running" obligations as well as negative limitations.
Letter from Russell L. Brenneman to R.R. Bullivant, supra note 95.
156. But only after three permutations of the Act's title.
157. Komgold, supra note 5, at 436-37. Korngold urged that the temptation to do so
should be avoided for two reasons:
First, assuming there is validity to the traditional dichotomy between real
covenants and easements, conservation servitudes more closely resemble
real covenants than easements and hence should not be labeled and
treated as easements. Although conservation servitudes are negative
restrictions, they do not resemble any of the four traditional types of
negative easements. Like real covenants, conservation servitudes are
"promises respecting the use of land."
Id.
158. UCEA, Commissioners' Prefatory Note
3-5. In doing so, the NCCUSL rejected
two alternatives: first, removing the common law disabilities associated not only with
easements, but also real covenants and equitable servitudes when used for conservation;
second, creating a new interest, a "statutorily modified amalgam of the three traditional
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this Act, a conservation easement may be created, conveyed, recorded,
assigned, released, modified, terminated, or otherwise altered or affected
in the same manner as other easements." 1 9 Thus, the CE resembles the
common law analogue in many particulars.
Unfortunately, the commissioners clarified the nomenclature
without clarifying what a CE actually is. The UCEA has been less
successful in imposing the commissioners' views of CEs as interests in
land as distinct from a mere agreement or restriction regarding its use.
Questions about the nature of the instrument arose early in the drafting
process. Brenneman mused:
Are we creating anything that can rightly be called an
"interest in the land" or a free-floating right to enforce
promises in respect to land entirely independent of classical
"interests"? What is the importance of making this
doctrinal identification? If a promise blessed with statutory
authentication serves a properly "charitable" social
purpose... and is recorded on the land records, what does it
matter what it is called... ?160
One way to understand the importance of this question is to ask,
if land under an easement were taken for public purposes, for what,
specifically, would the easement holder be compensated? The drafters
did not agree on the precise nature of the stick in the bundle. What was
being condemned? In Maryland, Burnett noted, the owner of property
subject to a donated CE would be compensated for the full value of the

common law interests." The Commissioners' Prefatory Note provides three reasons for
favoring the easement designation:
First, lawyers and courts are most comfortable with easements and
easement doctrine, less so with restrictive covenants and equitable
servitudes, and can be expected to experience severe confusion if the Act
opts for a hybrid fourth interest. Second, the easement is the basic lessthan-fee interest at common law; the restrictive covenant and the equitable
servitude appeared only because of then-current, but now outdated,
limitations of easement doctrine. Finally, non-possessory interests
satisfying the requirements of covenant real or equitable servitude
doctrine will invariably meet the Act's less demanding requirements as
"easements." Hence, the Act's easement orientation should not prove
prejudicial to instruments drafted as real covenants or equitable
servitudes, although the converse would not be true.
Id. 5.
159. UCEA § 2(a).
160. Brenneman, Background, Issues and Options, supra note 91, at 5.
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property if a condemnation occurred, as if the holder of the
161
nonpossessory interest never owned a stick with any value at all.
Unfortunately, the commissioners were not consistent about the
nature of CEs as interests in land throughout the drafting process. 162 The
Land Trust Alliance (LTA) web page clouds the water, defining a CE as
"a legal agreement between a landowner and a land trust or government
agency that permanently protects land while the landowner continues to
"163
own it.
Land trusts muddy the issue further when they use the "bundle
of sticks" metaphor to describe an easement - which compensates the
landowner for transferring certain "sticks" to the land trust to harvest,
build, subdivide, or mine, for example. 64 This would support an
161. 1980 Proceedings, supra note 97, at 55 (remarks of Burnett). Burnett notes that the
Maryland provision does not reflect confusion regarding the nature of CEs, but rather an
effort to reduce the temptation for government agencies to focus condemnations of private
property for projects on land that had been lowered in value by an easement. Email from
K. King Burnett, member of NCCUSL Special Committee on the UCEA and former
president, to Mary Ann King (on file with author). See also RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICK J.
ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 581 (1968) (noting that, in most states, the
condemnation of a conservation easement would be treated as the taking of an interest in
property, and compensation would be paid to the holder of the easement). For discussion
on the issue of valuating a modified or terminated easement, see McLaughlin, Increasing,
supra note 13, at 68-91.
162. Note as well that recommended nomenclature continues to change. TNC and TPL
commissioned research to formulate an "everyday vocabulary which resonates with the
general electorate." Memorandum from Lori Weigel, Public Opinion Strategies, John
Fairbank & Dave Metz, Fairbank, Maslin, Maullin & Assoc. to The Nature
Conservancy/Trust for Public Land, Lessons Learned Regarding the "Language of
Conservation" from the National Research Program 1 (June 1, 2004). The report offers "A
New Vocabulary for Conservation Easements." Id. at 5. The consultants recommend
avoiding the term easements and using a vocabulary that stresses "the voluntary nature of
land preservation agreements." "Voluntary is inherent in the word 'agreement,' which in
part explains why phrases which incorporate the word 'agreement' test far better than the
word 'easement.'" Id. at 6. The public responds more positively to "land preservation
agreements" or "land protection agreements" than conservation easements. Id. at 5.
163. Land Trust Alliance, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.lta.org/faq/
index.shtml (last visited Mar. 24, 2006). We return to questions regarding whether a
conservation easement-as legal agreement or an interest in property-would have
sufficient heft to constitute a trust corpus below. The answer is not clear. But there is
sufficient possibility for courts to identify donated easements as charitable trusts and,
indeed, good reason for asserting that they ought to do so. See generally McLaughlin,
Rethinking, supra note 4.
164. The bundle of sticks metaphor is not itself without controversy. See Thomas W.
Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J.
357, 365 (2001). See generally Eric T. Freyfogle, The Owning and Taking of Sensitive Lands, 43
UCLA L. REV. 77 (1995); J.E. Penner, The Bundle of Rights Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L.
REV. 711 (1996); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Chix Nix Bundle-O-Stix: A Feminist Critique of the
Disaggregationof Property,93 MICH. L. REV. 239 (1994).
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"interest in land" argument. But land trusts also describe the forgone
rights as terminated. This disappearingstick theory receives considerable
support when land trusts assert that the disappeared stick cannot be sold
or has no value. That is, in turn, supported by the fact that in many
jurisdictions land trusts do not pay local property taxes on the easement
interests that they hold. 165 The confusion is compounded, however,
when a land trust asserts that a particular stick has disappeared and then
relies upon its value in another context. 66 For example, a land trust may
include the value of its easements when it reports its charitable income
for the year to the IRS.167 Similarly, land trusts use the value of an
easement as a basis for meeting matching requirements in federal
programs such as the Forest Legacy program.
Congress has concluded in Internal Revenue Code language that
"the donation of the perpetual conservation restriction gives rise to a
,,168
property right, immediately vested in the donee organization ....
Surprisingly, that does not seem to have resolved the matter as we shall
discuss when we turn to the issue of charitable trusts. Meanwhile, a
"here-today-gone-tomorrow-but-here-it-is-back-again" stick will not aid
69
land trusts in their renewed attention to public credibility.1
165. See Arpad, supra note 117, at 112-20. In addition, Arpad argues that this does not
address the issue of who gets what if the easement is terminated for any reason. But see
McLaughlin, Increasing,supra note 13, at 25-26, 70-71; McLaughlin, Rethinking, supra note 4,
at 490-502.
166. See FAIRFAX ET AL., BUYING NATURE, supra note 1, at 176-77. Colleague and author
Nancy McLaughlin, when reviewing an earlier draft of this article, commented:
The problem is that it is little understood that an easement should be
treated as a restricted gift or charitable trust. Therefore, the value of the
easement is suppressed until released in the context of a cy pres
proceeding. At that point the value should be applied to similar charitable
purposes in another location or manner. The value of any restricted
charitable gift is suppressed in the holder's hands -i.e., the gift of a Monet
to an art museum that is subject to the condition that it cannot ever be sold
and must be displayed by the museum. How much is the Monet worth to
the museum if it is not allowed to sell it? It may be a net liability because
maintenance costs exceed the percentage of entrance fees attributable to
the Monet. But the museum will still list the Monet as an asset that has
value for certain purposes, such as insurance.
Email from Nancy McLaughlin to authors.
167. See Arpad, supra note 117, at 136. The IRS uses the reports to distinguish between a
public charity and a foundation. Land trusts need to ensure that they are viewed by the IRS
as a non-profit.
168. 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii) (2000). See also Arpad, supra note 117, at 108-29 (relied
upon heavily in this discussion).
169. Sellers responds, correctly, that IRS regulations require that the holder must be
compensated for any rights that are taken. Thus, the sticks do not go away-the holder
simply cannot sell or exercise them. Interview with William Sellers, supra note 108. This
again raises the possibility that the easement is not a right or a stick, but a restriction.
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5. Sweeping: A Summary
The upshot of the NCCUSL's efforts is less clear than might first
appear. CEs, freed from the strictures of appurtenance and broadened in
their purpose, were rapidly embraced by conservationists. The
clarification of the tax-deductible status of donated easements and the
enactment of state CE legislation allowed an enormous expansion of the
land trust movement. Nevertheless, serious issues remained.
The commissioners had justified their treatment of CEs as a
private ordering system both practically and philosophically,17 0 but there
was no consensus on this point, and confusion remains. The combination
of expanding purposes and removing the interested neighbor created
important, largely unseen problems in recordation, monitoring, and
enforcement. Perhaps that is just as well: a neighbor who could
remember a traditional easement for access across her neighbor's land
could monitor and enforce it by crossing the property and informing a
new fee-holder about it if the underlying property changed owners; the
neighbor might be hard pressed to do the same for a modem CE with
complex provisions to protect air or water quality.171 But the UCEA did
not address the newly enabled complexity in CEs by creating
accountability mechanisms appropriate to the task. Instead, it relied on
rather remote elements of the same common law just swept partially
away. To understand the confused accountability picture provided by
the UCEA, it is necessary to look as well at the elements of common law
that the commissioners left undisturbed.
C. Confused and Continuing Straws of Applicable Common Law
The commissioners were hopeful, if clearly not unanimous in
their sentiment, that continuing common law doctrine provided
appropriate constraints on charitable holders and CEs. In this section we
discuss the constraints they left in place. We address perpetuity (our
discussion combines eminent domain, charitable trust law, and
marketable title acts), the doctrine of merger, and existing liens and
encumbrances. The NCCUSL left the CE, if not in the dreaded cobwebs,
at least well within reach of other straws of common law that can and do
create confusion without establishing meaningful public accountability.

170. See UCEA, Commissioners' Prefatory Note 7.
171. See generally King & Fairfax, supra note 102 (discussing the problems of enforcing
water quality and quantity oriented easements).
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1. Perpetuity
One of the land trust's chief selling points regarding a CE is its
alleged perpetuity. The UCEA provides that "a conservation easement is
unlimited in duration unless the instrument creating it otherwise
provides." 172 More compelling, the IRS insists that a temporary or term
173
CE is not eligible for charitable treatment in federal income tax returns.
But the CE's vaunted perpetual protection is far more illusory than land
trust advocacy might suggest.
The issue of perpetuity was debated by the NCCUSL: many
commissioners challenging the proposed UCEA language echoed the
anti-dead hand tradition. Accountability to the public was a major
concern of those opposing permanent easements. Allowing a private
agreement to control land use forever against community interests
seemed particularly problematic. One commissioner suggested that
"restrictions which can go on in perpetuity, without any.. .ability of the
community to intervene in its own interest, seems to me a terribly radical
proposition." 174 Another, "fearful that this [perpetuity language] gives
approval to an unlimited condition," advocated term easements. "I
would ask whether the Committee gave any thought to making
preservation or CEs good for a period, and then renewable, to put some
"175
check in time on this.
Commissioners were aware that removing protections against
the dead hand was upsetting a long-standing and appropriately
venerated apple cart. But advocates defended perpetuity as essential:
Ridding property of "stale" restrictions is a valid and
valuable purpose underlying marketable title acts, the
doctrine of "changed conditions" and other firmly rooted
common law concepts. Yet, it is assumed that the proposed
controls, especially those for land conservation and historic
preservation, may serve their purpose only if enforceable
for very long periods of time ....
176
In the end, the commissioners waffled; they embraced perpetuity but did
not protect CEs from standard judicial tools for modifying or terminating

172. UCEA § 2(c).
173. 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(2)(C) (2000).
174. 1979 Proceedings,supra note 6, at 49 (remarks of Comm'r Hershman).
175. Proceedings in Comm. of the Whole, Uniform Conservation EasementAct of the NCCUSL,
28 (Aug. 4-5, 1981) [hereinafter 1981 Proceedings] (remarks of Comm'r Wellmann).
176. Brenneman, Background, Issues and Options, supra note 91, at 9.
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an easement. 77 This fit with their philosophy of treating CEs like any
similar private property interest. But the straddle leaves the CE
enmeshed in some complex straws of accountability that can be grabbed
to protect or defang their conservation goals.
a. Eminent Domain
The most obvious threat to perpetual CEs is eminent domain, the
government's authority to take land, or interests in land, from unwilling
sellers for public purposes. The UCEA made no effort to protect CEs
from condemnation. The UCEA "neither limits nor enlarges the power of
eminent domain" regarding either condemning easements or the eased
property. 178 Without exception, government officials are reluctant to
actually use the condemnation authorities they have, but over time, if a
CE becomes burdensome on a community or a public purpose, public
officials are not without recourse. 79
b. Charitable Trust Doctrine
The UCEA also left open the possibility that CEs would be
interpreted as charitable trusts. 18° States have codified common law trust

177. See Robert H. Levin, Men Forever Proves Fleeting: The Condemnationand Conversion
of Conservation Land, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 592 (2001); Terri Finkbine Arnold, Condemnation
and Conservation Easements, BACK FORTY, Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 6.11; Geysers Pipeline Threatens
Sanctuary, 31 LEAVES (Madrone Audubon Soc'y), Oct. 1997, available at http://audubon.
sonoma.net/newsletter/v31n2/v31n2.html (In Sonoma County, California, the Mayacamaus Mountains Sanctuary faced a threat of condemnation by the City of Santa Rosa for a
pipeline through the ostensibly "forever wild" preserve.).
178. UCEA, Commissioners' Prefatory Note 11.
179. FAIRFAX ET AL., BUYING NATURE, supra note 1, at 263-64 (expressing our opinions
about the wisdom of eminent domain). Compare with the "inalienability" rules under
which the British National Trust operates. See Lauren Gwin & Sally K. Fairfax, England's
National Trust: What Can It Teach U.S. Land Trusts? (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) (noting that lands declared "inalienable by the [National Trust] are not subject to
compulsory purchase without the site specific approval of Parliament").
180. 1979 Proceedings, supra note 6, at 37-38 (remarks of Bullivant). Bullivant raised an
interesting issue that we do not consider here but that merits further analysis, that the
relationship goes beyond a charitable trust and may implicate a public trust:
[OIn the issue of termination by agreement of the involved parties, I agree
this is a very feasible and worthwhile objective. But we are somewhat
concerned, because these instruments may create a public trust. Once it is
created, irrespective of the language of the creating document, you may
run into a problem of whether you can by this agreement effectively
foreclose those persons which may be entitled to assert some area of the
public interest not specifically contemplated by or provided for in the
originating document.
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principles in statutes in slightly different ways, but the basics are
familiar. Rules for establishing a trust, what it entails, and for dealing
with non-performing trustees and changed conditions are especially
important for those interested in CEs. 181 The commissioners, as we noted
above, discussed but did not resolve the relationship between CEs and
charitable trusts. 182 But the issue is crucial because charitable trust
accountability mechanisms are not well adapted to established land trust
practice.183
i. What is a charitable trust and why does it matter if a CE is viewed as
one?
Basically, a trust is established when a trustor directs a trustee to
manage designated property to achieve specific benefits for an identified
beneficiary.184 A charitable trust is one that benefits the general public and
can be distinguished from a private trust, which is designed to benefit
the trustor's grandchild or someone similarly situated, in principle part
because courts allow charitable but not private trusts to be perpetual.
Moreover, trust rules do not require an explicit attempt to create a trust.
If the easement donor/fee holder fits the role of the settlor, the land trust
is the trustee, and the general public is the beneficiary, then the courts
might find an implied trust even if one was not intentionally or clearly
established. 85
Most trust law is designed to protect the beneficiary -who is
presumably less familiar with the business of the trust and the ways of
the world than the trustee -specifically from the trustee. Moreover, trust
principles generally assign an insignificant continuing role to the settlor
181. Fairfax and Guenzler make a hard distinction between the two that is useful but
may turn out not to be the complete story. See FAIRFAX & GUENZLER, supra note 4.
182. The most interesting issue seems to be whether an easement is sufficiently weighty
to constitute trust property. The commissioners' position that easements are an interest in
land is, as noted above, not consistent, nor are land trusts' positions.
183. Readers may already have noticed that both the applicability of charitable trust
principles to conservation easements and the desirability of using those principles to
address problems of easement modification and termination are under intense discussion
as we write. We are skeptical on both counts and emphasize that the unsettled issues create
uncertainty for public accountability. McLaughlin, Rethinking, supra note 4, and JEFF PIDOT,
REINVENTING CONSERVATION EASEMENTS: A CRMCAL EXAMINATION AND IDEAS FOR REFORM

(2005), are strong advocates on both counts. Arpad, supra note 117, perhaps falls somewhere in the middle.
184. For the particulars, with slight legal detail but diverse applications, SOUDER &
FAIRFAX, supra note 4, at 2-4, and FAIRFAX & GUENZLER, supra note 4, at 27, are good places
to start.

185. For the fastest possible rundown on implied trusts, see FAIRFAX & GUENZLER, supra
note 4, at 27.

Winter 20061

CONSERVATION EASEMENTS

of the trust. The idea is that the settlor's role is confined to defining the
purposes of the trust. But that relationship is precisely the opposite of
what land trusts usually experience: the land trust is locked in a
relationship, not with the grantor, but with the holder of the underlying
fee, for which there is no analogy in charitable trust doctrine.
Applying the charitable trust doctrine to CEs is controversial
within the land trust community. Most obviously, trust rules envision
the worst possible relationship between the trustee and the beneficiary
and contemplate a significant role for the attorney general in protecting
the public. As noted above, land trust discussions of outside third-party
enforcement have often been reluctant or hostile.
ii. Other basic trust principles
Other elements of trust law may not fit well with land trust
practice. First, trust rules require the trustee to disclose fully to the
beneficiary information about transactions. In the current political
climate, full disclosure may be an appropriate response to both public
concerns and to the increasing visibility of rogue land trusts that bend
CEs to private enurement. However, such disclosure could complicate
land trusts' relationships with landowners who want their private affairs
kept private.
Finally, the cy pres doctrine provides flexibility to courts to
protect the purposes of a trust in the face of changed conditions. This is
different both from what many citizens understand to be the essential
ingredient of a perpetual easement - it cannot be changed 86 - and what
the UCEA itself contemplated regarding modification of an easement.
Because the UCEA attempts to treat CEs as any other private ordering
system, presumably, the owner of the eased land and the CE holder may
enter agreements that modify an easement if state law permits the same
for conventional easements. 87 If charitable trust rules are applied to CEs,
186. Certainly land trusts and easement donors are aware of the extinguishment and
division of proceeds provisions required by the Treasury Regulations, as discussed in
McLaughlin, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 490-92, but the general public is not. Clarifying the
constraints on perpetuity is an important element of necessary improvements in public
accountability.
187. UCEA, Commissioners' Prefatory Note
8. Section 2 of the UCEA discusses
"Creation, Conveyance, Acceptance and Duration" of conservation easements. Section 2(a)
provides that "a conservation easement may be created, conveyed, recorded, assigned,
released, modified, terminated, or otherwise altered or affected in the same manner as
other easements." The comments clarify further that
conservation easements are indistinguishable from easements recognized
under the pre-Act law of the state in terms of their creation, conveyance,
recordation, assignment, release, modification, termination or alteration.
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the doctrine of cy pres would allow modification of an easement, but the
process and the parties are considerably different. Cy pres allows the
court to reformulate the trust to achieve the settlor's intentions to the
maximum extent possible. The classic case involves a trust established to
educate slaves that was somewhat undone by emancipation. When the
next in line for the property sought to terminate the trust on that basis,
the court relied upon the cy pres doctrine to jiggle the trust purpose ever
so slightly-it became a trust to educate freed men-to preserve the
settlor's charitable intent.18
Although the UCEA language on easement modification appears
to treat a CE as any other easement, the UCEA also suggests that the
doctrine of cy pres may be available. 8 9 The difference is that, under the
first reading, the parties negotiate changed easement terms that suit their
priorities. Obviously, the easement holder is responsible for upholding
the public purposes of the easement, but oversight is limited. Under the
cy pres/charitable trust reading, the courts have a role in defining
appropriate modifications or alternatives to the CE terms in a situation in
which it is genuinely impossible for the trustee to achieve the purposes
of the trust. One commissioner explained the rationale:
The intent there was to include principles involving trust
and cy-pres... and because under Section 1 a charitable type
of relationship is invoked, and is necessarily invoked when
you define a holder, any court which is going to be
confronted with a modification or termination problem has
got to consider not only the law of easements with respect
to modification and termination, but also trust implications,
such as cy-pres. 19°
This is a double-edged sword. Access to cy pres flexibility allows
the courts to define an appropriate response to changed conditions and
provides a process for adjusting CE terms to new data or conservation
priorities. It also could parry to economists' complaints about perpetuity

In this regard subsection (a) reflects the Act's overall philosophy of
bringing less-than-fee conservation interests under the formal easement
rubric and of extending that rubric to the extent necessary to effectuate the
Act's purposes given the adopting state's existing common law and
statutory framework.
Id. § 2 cmt. 1.
188. See FAIRFAx & GUENZLER, supra note 4, at 33.
189. See also UCEA § 3 cmt.
2-3.
190. 1981 Proceedings, supra note 175, at 32 (remarks of Bullivant).
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and the dead hand.191 On the other hand, it is the courts, not the
easement or fee holders that reshape the CE/ trust. Indeed, if the CE is in
fact a charitable trust, neither the land trust nor the fee holder, but only
the court can modify a CE purpose. 192 In some CE documents, the
easement and fee holders are authorized to make minor adjustments
unless a party with standing, typically the AG, objects. In the latter case,
the court would become involved. Land trusts may not appreciate the
courts redefining easement terms, 193 nor would they necessarily want the
courts entering into the delicate relationship between fee and easement
holder. The possibility might put off landowners potentially interested in
an easement transaction.
Finally, trust principles give the courts a significant role in
dealing with failed trusts and trust termination. Again, a court may
make different decisions about modifying or terminating a CE/trust
than the land trust might.
Clearly, the public interest in CEs is sufficient to justify efforts to
constrain easement and fee holders from modifying the terms of the
agreement at will. Just as clearly, charitable trust rules are generally
designed to hold trustees to the trust's purposes. However, it is less
obvious that trust principles are mandated in the CE context and less
obvious still that they are optimal in achieving accountability. Although
the public could perhaps find a protective harbor in charitable trust
principles, 194 that is not necessarily the outcome. 195 The state AG can
191. Julia D. Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions on Land and the Problem of the Future, 88 VA.
L. REV. 739, 777-79 (2002) Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Trouble with Time: Influencing the
Conservation Choices of FutureGenerations, 44 NAT. REsouRcEs J. 601, 613 (2004).
192. A few commissioners suggested that charitable organizations like land trusts
should exercise caution and care in modification: "Mr. Chairman, in the alternative
draft.. .it says: 'Conservation and preservation agreements may be transferred by the
holder.' But it seems to me that the holder has an interest in perpetuities that no one else
can challenge. They may very well not want to do that." 1979 Proceedings, supranote 6, at 32
(remarks of Commissioner Davies).
And we felt that the parties then in interest- to wit, the holder or the
alternate enforcer or the grantor or his agents -should be able, if they are
prepared, to enter into such a type of modification.
However, it would seem that if this modification involved a substantial
change, the parties, like any prudent trustee, would seek the advice of a
court, to protect them in what they are doing.
Id. at 35 (remarks of Bullivant).
193. A court would not, of course, have carte blanche to rewrite easements. They go
through a rather tightly choreographed series of analyses designed to protect the purpose
of the easement as closely as possible. See McLaughlin, Rethinking, supranote 4, at 464-80.
194. For example, in Maine, a UCEA-influenced state according to Mayo, most
easements are drafted as hybrids of statutory easements/express charitable trusts. When a
town sought to terminate a land use restriction on a property by selling an easement back
to a developer, the effort was "forestalled by a well-placed inquiry to the town by the
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decide whether or not to play a major role in easement enforcement. An
understaffed AG's office cannot be counted on to provide the kind of
oversight that land trusts and conservation easements require. Indeed,
there is no guarantee that an AG sensitive to the priorities of wealthy
landowners would act to assure the integrity of the public's investment
in an easement.
As noted above, over the course of the UCEA debate, the AG
faded from explicit mention in the text. However, if charitable trust
doctrine applies, the AG can come back, not only to participate in
decisions regarding whether to enforce the terms of the easement on
behalf of the public, but also to participate in decisions regarding the
modification and termination of easements that have over time become
unworkable or no longer serve a public purpose. Land trusts are not
generally enthusiastic about what could amount to a significant loss of
discretion. They may not be accustomed to acting "on behalf of" a
beneficiary, except in quite theoretical terms. Some form of
accountability is obviously required -but both the ambiguities regarding
the applicability of charitable trust doctrine and the apparent and real
incompatibilities between land trust practice and charitable trust
principles suggest that it may not adequately address land trust
accountability problems. 196

attorney general, who noted that the easement was granted 'in trust.'" Karen Marchetti &
Jerry Cosgrove, Conservation Easements in the Firstand Second Federal Circuits, in PROTECTING
THE LAND: CONSERVATION EASEMENTS PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE, supra note 28, at 78, 88;
see Arpad, supra note 117, at 144 n.266, and accompanying text.
195. Marchetti and Cosgrove's tale, supra note 194, could have had a very different
outcome, of course, if the AG had been oppositely inclined.
196. McLaughlin and Pidot present compelling arguments that application of the
charitable trust doctrine may be the best and even perhaps the only available viable option
for existing easements. Advising on an earlier draft of this article, Pidot comments:
If conservation easements are not charitable trusts, what then? Can it
really be viable to argue that an easement, once established for the public
purposes that it expresses pursuant to an enabling law that was enacted to
allow those public purposes in derogation of the common law, is really
just a private arrangement between the land trust and the
landowner?... [T]hen what happens to an easement that is abandoned, as
many will be in coming years? If a tax deduction was taken, can it be that
Congress meant just to let the thing go? Does the AG really have no
charitable oversight of both the easement and of the land trust? In the end,
to me the strongest argument is that CEs are charitable trusts and LTs are
charitable trusts because all other roads lead ultimately to hell. I say let's
make this clear in the enabling statutes, but in the meantime we have to go
with the only thing that we have, which is charitable trust doctrine.
E-mail from Jeff Pidot, to Sally Fairfax & Mary Ann King (Aug. 4, 2005) (on file with
author).
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c. Marketable Title Acts
Marketable title acts, now codified in about one third of the
states, can be viewed as a statutory assist for the watchful neighbor.197
Designed to limit restrictions on real property, the statutes generally
provide that easements either expire automatically or must be rerecorded periodically. Thus, they could become a threat to the notion of
a perpetual CE. The UCEA comments are nevertheless clear that the
proposed statute does not deal with "potential impacts of a state's
198
marketable title laws upon the duration of conservation easements."
The commissioners left it up to the state to ensure that presumptively
perpetual CEs would remain valid if -a big, unclear, and unsettling if marketable title statutes were applied to easements. The ambiguity
generated discomfort with some of the commissioners, who questioned
the meaning of perpetuity.99 It continues to create ambiguity. 200
d. The Doctrine of Merger
Although not thoroughly discussed among the commissioners, 201 we note that CEs may become vulnerable under the common
law doctrine of merger. The basic idea is that obligations between two
parties that precede a purchase agreement disappear after a CE holder
becomes the fee holder. In this context, if the fee holder obtains title to
the CE or if the easement holder acquires the underlying fee, the
easement simply is merged back into the title and disappears. 2 2 This
could become an issue in two obvious ways. First, if a land trust holds an
197. For a quick rundown on marketable title acts as they apply to CEs, see
McLaughlin, Increasing, supra note 13, at 27 n.96. See generally Owley Lippmann, ECEs: The
Hard Case, supra note 142.
198. See UCEA, Commissioners' Prefatory Note 10; 1980 Proceedings,supra note 97, at
58 (remarks of Bullivant); E-mail from K. King Burnett to Mary Ann King (Nov. 1, 2005) (on
file with author).
199. Commissioner Dunham stated,
Under existing law in a marketable title state, I would take it that
perpetuity means no more than forty years, because the state statute so
provides... Adverse possession means that it can be terminated in twenty
years, o[r] whatever the state statute is. So I have a feeling that the
comments are trying to conceal from us what is really the case, that there
is no such thing as perpetuity....
1980 Proceedings,supra note 97, at 55 (remarks of Dunham).
200. McLaughlin discusses marketable title acts in Increasing,supra note 13, at 27, n.96.
201. Merger was discussed in the context of eminent domain proceedings. 1980
Proceedings,supranote 97, at 71-72 (remarks of Burnett).
202. Gary A. Van Cleve, Beware the Merger Doctrine- Rights in a Real Estate Contract Can
Be Lost Under the Doctrine of Merger, FINDLAW, http://library.findlaw.com/1999/Jun/1/
127328.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2006).
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easement on a property that it subsequently acquired in full fee, the
restrictions in the easement disappear. Second, if a land trust finds itself
a judgment debtor 2 3 and if the creditor can purchase the fee and then
gain the easement as part of a settlement, the protection in the easement
may be lost. In diverse circumstances, overlapping CEs held by different
organizations (or co-holding easements) may ensure that the CE is not
lost to the creditor, but neither the CE itself nor the land trust enjoys any
special protection. 2°4
e. Other Elements of Common Law Property
Finally, the UCEA is clear that the easement is "subject to
existing liens, encumbrances and other property rights (such as
205
The
subsurface mineral rights) which pre-exist the easement...."
comment was included at the insistence of a number of commissioners
concerned about the confusion that could result from placing a CE on
land where title was divided between surface and sub-surface owners.
Some commissioners feared that the Act could be used to argue that the
relationship between the owners had changed and that the CE could be
used to interfere with subsurface rights. Others feared that the CE would
involve the third-party CE holder in the original relationship, or that the
easement holder would have standing to enforce the easement against
actions outside the eased land that may be detrimental to easement
206
purposes.
D. The Benefits of a Lawyerly Discussion
The UCEA was an important vehicle for state legislation, but its
importance extends beyond removing common law barriers to CEs.
Despite its title, the UCEA did not result in uniform law across states.
But the UCEA represented a well thought-out and integrated effort that

203. See FAIRFAX & GUENZLER, supra note 4, at 188-90. See also Rob Levin & Jessica Jay,
Memorandum of Law 4-7 (Legal Roundtable on Third-Party Standing, LTA Rally 2003).
204. Discussed in FAIRFAX & GUENZLER, supra note 4, at 78, 188-90. Levin and Jay believe
that it is "relevant to query whether courts afford standing to multiple holders; if so, how
(individual or joint); and how the co-holders define their own relationship to the
conservation easement, grantor, and enforcement rights and responsibilities." Levin & Jay,
supra note 203, at 4.
205. UCEA, Commissioners' Prefatory Note § 2 cmt. 4.
206. 1980 Proceedings,supra note 97, at 26-27 (comments of Comm'r Thomas). See also
Jay, supra note 148, at 791 (discussing Tennessee Environmental Council and the precedent it
sets for creating standing for "citizens and neighbors to enforce conservation easements
against owners of property adjacent to and unencumbered by conservation easements for
their impacts to the easement property").
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provided the basics -a coherent definition of an easement and a careful
positioning relative to the common law terms and interpretations
(although not without ambiguity).
The importance of its provisions was amplified by the
involvement of national legal and legislative organizations like the ABA
and NCCUSL. Having a neutral body of real property lawyers and legal
scholars draft the proposal probably lent legitimacy to growing land
trusts by bringing credibility to the legal tools, the problems, and the
institutions involved. 20 7 In that sense, the drafting process (not just the
Act's language) was also important in building the infrastructure for the
growth of the land trust movement.
Second, part of the task of the NCCUSL is to promote the
adoption of the drafted legislation. Commissioners are expected to
return to their respective states and "seek introduction and enactment of
Uniform Acts." 208 Land trusts probably could not have hired better
consultants for drafting and pushing the legislation, and they did not
have to foot the bill for advocating for UCEA passage. The committee
members had experience working with public, private, local, regional,
state, and federal conservation and historic preservation programs; had a
comprehensive knowledge of the common law and its application to
CEs; and brought the states' perspectives and experience.
At the very least, the NCCUSL helped to put an arcane area of
the law in a more contemporary context and to articulate the importance
and the problems-and that may have been important to expanding a
budding land trust movement. The UCEA and the debate surrounding it
serve as an important reference. The Act generated a paper trail and
legislative history. The debates and comments are valuable reminders
that, for example, the name "conservation easement" and the
relationship between public agencies and private land trusts were not
inevitable.
But the majority's insistence on CEs as a private ordering system
bequeathed enormous accountability problems to the land trust
community. In spite of the participation of federal agencies that were
increasingly dependent on privately held CEs for the implementation of
their own land acquisition programs, the commissioners positioned CEs
as a private ordering system, choosing not to subject the new tool to
public oversight. Eliminating the watchful neighbor to facilitate CE
holding by non-appurtenant private charities opened the door to serious
problems in recordation, monitoring, and enforcement. And the
207.
208.
at 97.

Interview with William Sellers, supra note 108.
Constitution of the NCCUSL, art. 6, § 6.1, in NCCUSL, 2002-2003 REFERENCE BOOK,
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remaining straws of common law accountability are confusing,
inappropriate, and not clearly available to interested members of the
public. The layers of IRS supervision, charitable trust provisions, and the
host of other justifications that the commissioners stated to support their
conclusion that CEs would support the public interest do not assure
adequate public accountability.
We have concluded that the UCEA did not bind CE use or the
action of CE holders tightly enough to ensure that CE transactions are
publicly accountable, that they serve the public interest, that they
provide public benefits commensurate with public investment, that they
are monitored and enforced adequately, or that the public is assured
access to information about the easements. Nevertheless, the NCCUSL
discussions provide useful insight into the pitfalls and remedies of
private ordering. The debates can be used as a catalog both of what
could transpire and of what has gone wrong in the land trust movement.
Revisiting those arguments provides both a glimpse into the history of
the CEs and land trusts and a valuable guide for reforming the CE and
the standard land trust practice.
IV. AND THEN WHAT HAPPENED: THE CALL FOR
ACCOUNTABILITY
The efforts of NCCUSL and others in overcoming common law
impediments to enforcement were critical. They facilitated confident
reliance on CEs by both public and private entities. Twenty-two states
and the District of Columbia have adopted the UCEA in whole or in
part. The result has been a harmonization of some of the basic CE
provisions, but not uniformity across states. The land trust movement
has been growing steadily since the Second World War.
A. The Rapid Expansion of the Land Trust Movement
Two factors contributed greatly to the rapid emergence of land
trusts and CEs.2° 9 First, since the 1980s, the federal and state
governments have for diverse reasons -changing expectations about the
role of government, fiscal crises, and budget short falls-cut back on
their land acquisition programs. 210 Second, landowner participation has
been encouraged by myriad tax benefits. A series of IRS decisions
beginning in the 1960s and later legislative clarifications and regulations
209. See FAIRFAX ET AL., BUYING NATURE, supra note 1, chs. 7, 8.
210. Id. But note that state and local bond issues and referenda continue to provide
funding for state and local acquisition programs. Id. at 241.
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determined that donated CEs qualified as deductions from the donor's
taxable income. In addition, a CE frequently lowers the appraised value
of a property, creating property and estate tax benefits. 211 When these
pieces fell into place in the early to mid-1980s, the land trust movement
took off.
Graph 1. Number of Land Trusts, 1950-2003212
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Graph 1 shows that this steady growth has intensified in the last
decade: the number of land trusts has increased 26% between 1998 and
2003 alone. The number of CEs has also increased dramatically in the
same period. Total acreage conserved by local and regional land trusts
doubled, from 4.7 million to 9.4 million, and CEs account for most of that
increase: local and regional land trusts hold 17,847 CEs, up from 7,392 in
1998, and the total acreage protected by CEs has increased 266% since
2 3
1998, from 1,385,000 to 5,067,929 in 2003. 1

211. McLaughlin, Increasing, supra note 13, at 36, 39; Land Trust Alliance, Advocates
Alert: Congressional Committee Proposes Severe Cuts in Easement Deductions (Jan. 28,
2005), http://www.lta.org/publicpolicy/adv_012805.htm. See also STAFF OF JOINT COMM.
ON TAXATION, OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES, JCS-

02-05, at 277-87 (2005), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/s-2-05.pdf.
212. The Land Trust Alliance: Land Trust Census, graph 1, availableat http://www.lta.
org/census/index.shtml (last visited Nov. 18, 2004).
213. Id. LTA data does not include information regarding the acreage protected or
conservation easements held by national land trusts, TNC, TPL, and TCF.
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B. A Shaky Start on Adolescence: Blurring of Public and Private and
Calls for Greater Accountability
The movement's tough adolescence began as the dot.com bubble
ran out of steam. The LTA came on hard financial times in the late 1990s
and began to cut services and consolidate. 214 It is easy to overstate the
current difficulties; a myriad of issues and organizations have threatened
the viability of the land trust movement and CEs.
1. The Sagebrush Rebellion
Criticisms of the land trust movement became apparent even
during the NCCUSL process. Among the first were Wise Use
Movement/Sagebrush rebels 215 concerned about land trusts' role in
expanding federal land holdings. As one commissioner remarked, "It's
shocking to me that we're today considering this kind of arrangement
with respect to conservation to place in government control more and
216
more land."
Some commissioners representing western states expressed
concern about the possibility that CEs would add to federal land
holdings. Today critics also highlight the degree to which land trusts
protect land by "preacquiring" parcels for subsequent government
purchase. 217 While the commissioners focused on their preferred "private
ordering system," critics within NCCUSL and elsewhere protested the
blurring of public and private programs.
2. The PrivateProperty Rights Movement
The land trust movement also became the target of intense
criticism from private property rights advocates. If one were inclined to
assume that private property interests would applaud the CE's
compensated approach to land regulation, 218 one would be wrong. They
214. FAIRFAX ET AL., BUYING NATURE, supra note 1, at 209.
215. See, e.g., R. MCGREGGOR CAWLEY, FEDERAL LAND, WESTERN ANGER: THE
SAGEBRUSH REBELLION AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS (1993); RETHINKING THE FEDERAL

LANDS (Sterling Brubaker ed., 1984).
216. 1979 Proceedings,supra note 6, at 61 (remarks of Comm'r McClaugherty).
217. More recently, preacquisitions have been expanded and complicated by complex
land exchanges, in which private entities such as land trusts serve as a go-between, helping
both the government and private holders acquire parcels that would be useful to balance a
large land swap. For more detail on both preacquisitions and land exchanges, see FAIRFAX
ET AL., BUYING NATURE, supra note 1, at 191, 63-66, 211-15, respectively. On land exchanges
generally, see Janine Blaloch and the Western Lands Project website at http://www.
westlx.org.
218. See generally Cheever, supra note 24; FAIRFAX ET AL., BUYING NATURE, supra note 1.
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were early and outspoken opponents of the land trusts' public
transactions in private clothing. A consistently credible refrain in their
sometimes outrageous rhetoric has been that decisions that affect the
livelihood and environment of communities ought to be debated
219
publicly, not glossed as private and put beyond public comment.
The property rights groups exhibited political muscle in
Congress during debates on the Conservation and Reinvestment Act
(CARA). At the end of the Clinton administration, and in spite of
considerable support from conservative representatives who viewed
CARA's funding provisions as an effective means for states to increase
their share of outer-continental shelf oil revenues, conservationists were
unable to achieve passage of a spectacular federal funding scheme. 220
CARA would have provided $2.8 billion a year in funding over 15 years,
largely for land acquisition, much of it to be administered by or in
cooperation with land trusts. CARA was defeated by private property
rights advocates that have continued to play a significant role even in
221
land trust transactions.
3. Charitable Trust Issues Are Raised but Not Resolved
Just as CARA failed, the complicating possibilities that CEs
could be interpreted as charitable trusts emerged in a dispute regarding
CE amendment. 222 One opportunity for a clarification of the relationship
between CEs, land trusts, and charitable trust law was lost in 1998 when
the parties settled a vexing case regarding a National Trust for Historic
Preservation (NTHP) easement on the "Myrtle Grove" property in
Easton, Maryland. However, the spectacle of a quasi-government
agency 223 invoking charitable trust law to reverse its own politically
unacceptable decision speaks volumes regarding the need for public
oversight and participation in land trust decisions.

219. FAIRFAX ET AL., BUYING NATURE, supra note 1, at 261-62.
220. See id. at 239-42.
221. The authors' research assistant, Matt Gerhart, talked with David Brooks and
Margaret Stuart, Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee; Shawn Whitman, Staff
to Senator Craig Thomas; Max Peterson, International Association of State Fish and
Wildlife Agencies; and John Doggett, American Farm Bureau, who greatly enhanced our
understanding of CARA.
222. The Washington Post ran a series of articles in 1998 about the Myrtle Grove
controversy that were quite supportive of the NTHP's position to prevent subdivision. The
series featured such headlines as Peter S. Goodman, Agreement Saves Estate on Maryland's
Eastern Shore; Trust Had Wrongly Approved Subdivision, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 1998, at G7.

223. NTHP was created by legislation in October 1949 and received federal funding
until 1998. It is presently a nonprofit. A history of the organization is available on the
NTHP website at http://www.nationaltrust.org/aboutthetrust/history.htnil.
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The easement, donated to the NTHP in 1975, precluded
subdivision and development of the property. In the late 1980s, the
underlying fee changed hands-the original grantor passed away and
her heirs sold Myrtle Grove. The new owners petitioned the NTHP to
subdivide the property. In 1994, the NTHP agreed to modify the
easement to permit the subdivision in return for a 20-acre easement over
an adjacent tract, new documentation, and funding for additional
easement enforcement. 224 Under pressure, the NTHP withdrew its
approval a few months later, asserting that the amendment had been
"improvidently granted," 225 and the new owner sued. The NTHP used
charitable trust law, among other things, to support its revised
conclusion, claiming that the existence of a charitable trust on Myrtle
226
Grove would not allow the NTHP to treat the easement so cavalierly.
Numerous land trust interests, including TNC and LTA, joined as
friends of the court, filing amicus briefs in support of the NTHP's
position.227

The Maryland AG filed a separate case against both the
landowners and the NTHP.228 Although the state had taken no direct
role in negotiating or paying for the easement, the AG recognized the
importance of the case for Maryland's large investment in CEs. 229 He
argued that "Myrtle Grove is, or is subject to, a charitable trust for the
benefit of the people of Maryland, and that the terms of the trust may not
be broken." 230 A settlement in which the NTHP paid the developer
$225,000 ended both lawsuits and the possibility of clarifying the issue.231
224. Memorandum of Law in Support of Attorney General's Motion for Summary
Judgment at 12, Att'y Gen. for the State of Maryland v. Miller, No. 20-C-98-003486 (Cir. Ct.
for Talbot County, Md.).
225. Letter from David A. Doheny, Vice President and General Counsel, National Trust
for Historic Preservation, to Thomas A. Coughlin, Esq. (June 27, 1994). We are not
convinced that, balancing what was lost and gained, the choice was on its face a bad one.
226. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant Miller Trusts' Motion to Dismiss
or Stay at 4, Attorney Gen. for the State of Maryland v. Miller, Case No.: 20-C-98-003486
(Cir. Ct. for Talbot County, Md.).
227. Given the Myrtle Grove facts, this seems obvious. But one point in the discussion is
that the "right side" of the issue is not necessarily that easy to identify. A charitable trust
will not always help the land trust and/or its conservation goals.

228. Bill Silberstein, Law Update: The Doctrine of Merger as Applied to Conservation
Easements, EXCHANGE, Winter 1999, at 17.
229. "Perhaps most importantly this case raises issues of first impression of Maryland
law that could affect hundreds of preservation easements in Maryland held by state
agencies and private non-profit organizations." Memorandum of Law in Opposition to
Defendant Miller Trusts' Motion to Dismiss or Stay at 6, Attorney Gen. for the State of
Maryland v. Miller, Case No. 20-C-98-003486 (Cir. Ct. for Talbot County, Md.).
230. Id. at 4 (emphasis added). The Maryland AG filed suit in Talbot County Circuit
Court in Maryland. The landowners had filed suit against the NTHP in the District of

CONSERVATION EASEMENTS

Winter 20061

At present, the ambiguities in charitable trust law's relationship
to CEs remain. We do not know, for example, whether a CE is an interest
in property sufficient to give rise to an implied trust. When the NTHP
made an error in modifying an easement without consulting neighbors
or the public, the land trust community turned to the AG in hopes that
reliance on the charitable trust doctrine could correct the blunder. Thus,
the Myrtle Grove cases evince a need for a more explicit set of
expectations regarding public review and accountability concerning both
232
charitable trusts and CE amendment.
233

4. Exacted Easements

Issues of accountability for easements have been complicated
considerably by government agencies'- local, federal, and statereliance on easements exacted during planning and permitting
procedures. During the Reagan era, private land trusts were inclined to
present themselves as a private voluntary compensated alternative to
regulation, 2m and government regulators, anxious to avoid the political
and administrative costs of regulatory enforcement, were happy to
support CEs rather than regulations. The emergence of exacted CEsCEs created as part of government permitting processes under statutes
as diverse as the Federal Endangered Species Act 235 and local planning
efforts236-is a confusing pastiche of incentive-based conservation and
dispersion of government authority to nonprofit organizations.
Exacted CEs utilize the private ordering system in problematic
ways. Like highway and historic preservation programs, the federal
government relies on non-federal actors to achieve federal regulatory
Columbia Superior Court in 1994 (Patrice R. Miller et al. v. the National Trust for Historic
Preservation, No. 97-CA-787 (Super. Ct. for D.C., Civ. Div.)).
231. See Goodman, supranote 222.
232. There are a number of lessons to take from the Myrtle Grove experience. Public
consultation requirements or oversight measures, had they existed, might have alerted the
NTHP to the problems with its initial agreement to amend the easement to permit
subdivision. The awareness and involvement of other land trusts, however, indicates a
willingness and an ability on the part of the land trust community to identify standards for
easement amendment and to take action (by applying pressure or through legal action)
when the efficacy of an easement is threatened.
233. The expert on this subject is our colleague Jessica Owley Lippmann. See Owley
Lippmann, ECEs: The Hard Case, supra note 142; Owley Lippmann, Exacted CEs, supra note
142.
234. See Raymond & Fairfax, supranote 7, at 628-29. But see Cheever, supra note 24, who
suggests that perhaps a more accurate way to frame CEs is as a contracting out of the
regulatory process.
235. See, e.g., Owley Lippmann, ECEs: The Hard Case, supra note 142, at 142.
236. See, e.g., FAIRFAX & GUENZLER, supra note 4, at 195-97.
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goals. But it is not clear that such CEs are valid under state CE statutes, 237
and mechanisms for recording, monitoring, and enforcing these hybrid
easements are inadequate. Several preliminary reports conclude that the
government is shockingly ineffective at not only monitoring and
enforcing easement requirements, but also at recording them. 23 It is
extremely difficult to locate many exacted CEs. Although some land
trusts have avoided association with exacted CEs, 239 others are deeply
involved. 24° In the process, the credibility of CEs and land trusts has
eroded further.
5. The Washington Post, the IRS, and Congress
These scattered clouds on the horizon achieved critical mass, and
legs, when the Washington Post published a series of widely read articles
that were highly critical of The Nature Conservancy's business
practices. 241 Although many in the land trust movement speak privately
about the bias and basic misconceptions in what they regard as the Post's
sucker punch, the criticisms are nevertheless echoed elsewhere within
the land trust community. Perhaps most telling, attorney Stephen Small,
an architect of the CE tax law and a major practitioner in and supporter
of the land trust community, 242 sounded an alarm at the 2004 LTA
237. Owley Lippmann, ECEs: The Hard Case, supranote 142.
238. Owley Lippmann's work on CEs exacted in the Habitat Conservation Plan process
under the Endangered Species Act has been complicated by myriad difficulties in
identifying and locating the easements. See Owley Lippmann, ECEs: The Hard Case, supra
note 142, at 303 (observing that "[hiolders of conservation easements may be located
anywhere").
239. FAIRFAX & GUENZLER, supra note 4, at 155-68 (discussing the private Stephen
Phillipps Memorial Preserve Trust, which is at the center of a "growing web of land
conservation" in Maine).
240. See generally Owley Lippmann, ECEs: The Hard Case, supra note 142. The Tri-Valley
Conservancy in California receives easements from the Alameda County bonus density
plan. Similarly, the California Coastal Commission accepts "offers to dedicate" easements
from coastal property holders when granting them permission to develop. Amy Wilson
Easement
Morris, This Land: Private Rights and Public Benefits -Conservation
Governance in California and Massachusetts (Oct. 18, 2005) (unpublished qualifying exam
proposal, on file with author).
241. Stephens & Ottaway, $420,000 a Year, supra note 14; Joe Stephens & David B.
Ottaway, How a Bid to Save a Species Came to Grief, WASH. POST, May 5, 2003, at Al; Joe
Stephens & David B. Ottaway, Nonprofit Sells Scenic Acreage to Allies at a Loss: Buyers Gain
Tax Breaks with Few Curbson Land Use, WASH. POST, May 6, at Al. Ironically, the Washington
Post covered the Myrtle Grove case extensively and was sympathetic to the land trust's
position. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 222.
242.

See, e.g., THE FEDERAL TAX LAW OF CONSERVATION EASEMENTS (4th ed. 1997);

Stephen J. Small, An Obscure Tax Code Provision Takes PrivateLand Protection into the TwentyFirst Century, in PROTECTING THE LAND: CONSERVATION EASEMENTS PAST, PRESENT, AND
FuTURE, supra note 28, at 55; STEPHEN J. SMALL, PRESERVING FAMILY LANDS: ESSENTIAL TAX
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national meeting and in his publications: things in his practice had
begun to change. Initially, his clients had been individuals with
conservation interests trying to understand how to protect land. Now,
the customer base was different: "Private land protection was growing at
exponential rates and real estate developers, tax advisers, and
'promoters' outside of the traditional land conservation field started to
become more interested in the potential tax advantages.... "243
At the same 2004 meeting, IRS personnel presented a panel that
explained why they had singled out CEs for special review and what the
heightened review meant for land trust practice. Distressingly,
deductions for donated CEs appeared in the IRS presentation in the same
breath as donations of junker cars. This was not an enviable position to
be in.
Finally, a high profile congressional reconsideration of all
charitable deductions followed. 244 After several decades of seeming
inevitable, it was beginning to look like the land trust movement was
losing its wheels. The NCCUSL commissioners' suggestion that federal
tax law might provide one means of oversight over CEs proved correct.
As a result, the LTA and its members engaged in both defensive and
constructive actions designed to strengthen both the appearance and the
245
reality of public accountability.
V. WHAT SHOULD HAPPEN NEXT-USING THE UCEA TO
REFRAME ACCOUNTABILITY
In looking for ways to address the accountability issues created
by the UCEA's approach, we reiterate that the UCEA evolved
considerably during the drafting process. Whereas the first version
contemplated public agency approval of CEs and a host of similar
STRATEGIES FOR THE LANDOWNER (2nd ed. 1992); STEPHEN J. SMALL, PRESERVING FAMILY

LANDS, BOOK II: MORE PLANNING STRATEGIES FOR THE FUTURE (1997); Stephen J. Small, The
Tax Benefits of DonatingEasements in Scenic and HistoricProperty,7 REAL EST. L.J. 304 (1979).
243. Stephen J. Small, Proper-and Improper- Deductions for Conservation Easement
Donations,Including Developer Donations, TAX NOTES, Oct. 11, 2004, at 217, 218 (2004).
244. See supra note 211.
245. Rand Wentworth, President of the Land Trust Alliance, stated,
To crack down on transactions of dubious conservation purpose the
committee staff has considered requiring the federal government to certify
land trusts and/or conservation easements. As an alternative, LTA has
suggested that the committee allow land trusts to create a program of
voluntary self-regulation based on the Land Trust Standards and Practices,
and the LTA is studying the best approach to such a program.
Rand Wentworth, President's Column: Senate Finance Committee Pushes Reforms-LTA
Proposes New Ethical "Standardsand Practices," 23 EXCHANGE, Spring 2004, at 3.
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provisions, the commissioners quickly defined the Act's purposes more
narrowly. The UCEA did not wholly preclude public oversight, but the
commissioners rejected numerous proposals for it. Moreover, by leaving
in place much but not all of the common law, the drafters created talking
points and perhaps the appearance of oversight without identifying
useful tools and institutions for achieving it.
Because not all of the commissioners accepted the private
ordering notion that dominated the final draft, the UCEA debates
provide a useful source of insight into both the problems that beset the
land trust community and ways to approach them. Between 1975 and
1981, the NCCUSL wondered why CEs should be subjected to public
scrutiny. Almost a quarter of a century later, we reverse the
commissioner's logic to ask why the involvement of a charitable
organization in a conservation program should insulate public expenditures and management of public resources from public scrutiny.
Below, we draw upon the debates to call attention to changes
that must be made in our collective approach to CEs. We believe that for
some of the issues we have discussed a reconvened NCCUSL panel is
still the appropriate venue.
A. Amending the UCEA- And Not
In October 2001, members of the land trust community met with
federal, state, and land trust representatives and NCCUSL
commissioners to consider amending the UCEA to facilitate the use of
CEs for the remediation of superfund sites. The participants concluded
that an act separate from the UCEA was preferable. The Act was later
drafted and adopted by the NCCUSL as the Uniform Environmental
Covenants Act.2 4 6 But the environmental covenants discussion
precipitated a second and separate meeting to discuss the value of the
NCCUSL revisiting the UCEA. 247 This time around, rather than being
minor participants, the land trust community played host to the
discussions. The group considered re-opening the UCEA to address five
issues: (1) CE amendment; the vulnerability of easement to (2)
marketable title acts; (3) condemnation and (4) tax liens; and (5) the
extent of state involvement in issues of CE amendment and enforcement.
246. See William R. Breetz, Jr. & Roger D. Schwenke, Dirty Land, Clouded Title - The
Uniform Environmental Covenants Act Helps Clean-Up Both (Am. Coll. of Real Est. Law.
Seminar Article, 2004), availableat http://www.acrel.org/Documents/Seminars/Breetz.rtf.
247. King Burnett, who originally served on the NCCUSL's drafting committee for the
UCEA (and who was serving as both NCCUSL president and board member of the
Maryland Environmental Trust at the time), proposed the second meeting and LTA policy
Director Russ Shay convened it.
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The last concern was prompted, in part, by the then on-going Myrtle
Grove cases.248
In the end, the participants decided that there was little support
to amend state law. But calls for reopening the UCEA continue with
legitimate urgency. 249 We believe that amendment of the UCEA is an
appropriate avenue for addressing some, but not all, of the concerns
discussed in this article regarding CE accountability.
B. Issues That the NCCUSL Should Address
Three issues are sufficiently complex that they would benefit
from another round of lawyerly discussion and education. First, the issue
of whether a CE is an interest in property or a restriction on its use
deserves detailed consideration, not only because it implicates the whole
issue of whether a CE is a charitable trust, but also because it is
important to be able to inform the public and potential participants
about what is happening. Second, the charitable trust issue and
particularly its relationship to termination, modification, and enforcement would also probably best be debated, at least in the opening
instance, in the precincts of the NCCUSL. Finally, the diverse intricacies
of integrating CEs and public planning regimes-local, state, and
federal -could profit from additional NCCUSL review.
1. What Is a CE?
The UCEA debates make it clear, and subsequent events have
emphasized, that citizens and practitioners alike need a clearer
understanding of what a CE is. The UCEA debate regarding CEs as
interests in property versus agreements regarding land use has never
been adequately addressed. This unresolved bit of business is more than
semantics. It is a lynchpin in addressing the charitable trust issue: no
property interest, no charitable trust. But it also sharpens the public
accountability issue tremendously. If easements are servitudes and an
owner parts with valuable rights and is compensated, then the role of
land trusts as brokers in the transactions seems legitimate. If, as Cheever
has suggested, 250 CEs are a way of contracting out the dirty business of
writing and enforcing regulations, then expectations for adequate public
participation in the easement negotiation process are no less appropriate.

248.
249.
250.

Telephone Interview with Russ Shay, LTA Public Policy Director (Nov. 11, 2004).
PIDOT, supra note 183, at 36-37.
Cheever, supra note 24.
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Clarity regarding what a CE is seems both long overdue and essential to
any improvement in land trust credibility.
2. Charitable Trust or Not?
The Myrtle Grove case demonstrates the need for enlightenment
on this point as well. Some subset of the potential problems may be
readily addressed in careful easement drafting- individual easements
might be drafted to maximize or minimize the potential that they will be
interpreted as charitable trusts. A more detailed parsing of whether
charitable trust does apply to conservation easements is clearly needed.
The NCCUSL would fill an appropriate role in considering whether
charitable trust law provides an optimal approach to accountability and
deciding if and how to apply the contours of trust law to future land
trust transactions.
3. The Interface with Local and Federal Land Use Planning
Finally, the NCCUSL should revisit the relationship between
CEs and planning. When the commissioners first addressed the issue,
they focused on local planning. Advisors to the committee expressed
concern about the "unwanted consequences of unilateral 'singlepurpose' actions which may preempt more carefully considered
comprehensive land use strategies endorsed through a democratic
process by appropriate levels of government." 25 ' Language in early
forms of the UCEA even suggested that CEs incompatible with public
planning and zoning processes could be terminated if "enforcement of
25 2
the easement would violate a fundamental public policy of the state."
In attempting to define what might constitute a "fundamental public
policy," the commissioners included everything from zoning to
affordable housing. The issue clearly would benefit from the kind of
expert exploration that the NCCUSL could provide.
It would probably also have been appropriate, given the interest
of federal agencies in CEs, for the NCCUSL to address the relationship
between CEs and federal planning as well. The need for so doing is
unmistakable now. The NCCUSL appears to be particularly well suited
to address the issue, which merits a full airing among experts and an
open environment, one suited to address the issues on a more national

251. Letter from Norman Marcus, Counsel, City of New York Dep't of City Planning, to
J.C. Deacon, President, NCCUSL (Feb. 11, 1980) (on file with author).
252. 1980 Proceedings, supranote 97, at 36.
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stage. Here uniformity is at a premium, and the expectation of public
comment is deeply rooted.253
We are aware, of course, that states are free to ignore the results
of any sequel to the NCCUSL process. However, we are also impressed
by the benefits of the discussion that proceeded from their first effort.
That same kind of debate is needed now. Even if the result is not
uniformly adopted, it would put tools in place.
C. Issues That Organizations Other Than NCCUSL Are Probably
Better Qualified or Appropriate to Address
There are, of course, other organizations that are better
positioned than the NCCUSL to debate and resolve a different set of
accountability issues now confronting the land trust community.
1. Tax Deductions
The commissioners got this one right. They did not address tax
issues in 1980 and they should not address them today. Congress and the
IRS are the appropriate bodies to deal with CE and all other charitable
deductions. The outcome may not be as damaging as the LTA is
currently predicting. 254 Congress may back off from its more draconian
ruminations. However, even if it does, tax deductions for donated
easements may play a less important role in the future than they have in
the past; as Steven Small has suggested, we are moving out of the era in
which donated easements are the meat and potatoes of the land trust
movement. Many land trusts do not deal with donated easements at all,
and never have, 255 and many organizations and practitioners are now
more involved in purchased easements and assembled exchanges.
Although the discourse surrounding perpetual easements continues to
focus on IRS code and deductibility, Peter Forbes has suggested that
more than a third of CE donors eligible for federal tax deductions do not
bother to take them.256 Perhaps the tax consequences for donated
253. As it was during the drafting process. See supra Part II.D.
254. See LTA website, http://www.lta.org/publicpohcy/ppc.htm (last visited July 27,
2006).
255. For example, the Marin Agricultural Land Trust purchases all its easements in part
to allow the fee holder to reinvest in her farming practices.
256. Peter Forbes, personal communication with authors, at Society for the Protection of
New Hampshire Forests 100th Anniversary Celebration, Bretton Woods, N.H. (Sept. 21,
2001). Forbes reviewed TPL's transactions and found that "less than 2/3 of the below-fairmarket value-sellers had claimed a tax deduction" (by submitting IRS Form 8283, Noncash
Charitable Contributions). Peter Forbes, personal communication with authors, Nov. 15,
2005.
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easements should be framed not to encourage donations but-precisely
along the lines that Congress is contemplating- to assure that donated
easements are genuinely donated and in the public benefit. A reduced
emphasis on tax deductions might also open the way for the NCCUSL to
revisit the issue of term easements, which are not precluded by IRS rules
but are closely tied to its edicts.
2. Who Can Hold an Easement?
In its effort to encourage the use of CEs, the commissioners were
disinclined to define more stringent holder qualifications, but the
commissioners did contemplate the possibility of and solutions to CE
abuse. 257 Commissioners expressed concern that an individual with
"large sums of money and a particularly geared interest" might be able
to steer a charitable organization toward frustrating the public
purpose. 2 As "rogue land trusts" - organizations willing to sculpt
easement transactions toward private rather than public benefit-and
awareness of questionable transactions have become more widespread,
the UCEA debates provide examples of more exacting requirements on
holders.
The NCCUSL left the bar too low and inadequately defined who
can hold an easement. It could reconsider the matter. However, the LTA
is developing components of a system for land trust self-regulation. Its
recently revised Standards and Practices 259 provide a-framework for
ethical land trust practice, and its system for land trust accreditation
should be operational in 2008. The LTA plans to establish an
accreditation commission as a subsidiary of itself. Once the commission
is fully operational, commissioners will be elected by accredited land
trusts and appointed by the LTA board. The LTA continues to refine the
257. They discussed, for example, the possibility of permitting "a single private
individual to set up a dummy corporation and whatever else he wants to do to transfer
property with an open land easement in perpetuity...." 1980 Proceedings, supra note 97, at
79 (remarks of Comm'r Langrock).
258. Id. at 79-80. Another commissioner, opposing an approval role for government
planning bodies, responded that a zoning commission could be similarly unrepresentative
of the public interest.
Anybody who has been through a hearing of a typical planning
commission or zoning board -anybody who realizes that you can control
a planning commission or zoning board as readily as you can have the rich
person who is controlling the charitable corporation -would be very
concerned about allowing what purported to be a grant of easement in
perpetuity to be terminated or modified by a planning commission.
Id. at 80-81 (remarks of Comm'r Everett).
259.

LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, LAND TRUsT STANDARDS AND PRACTICES (revised 2004),

http://www.Ita.org/sp/index.html.
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criteria for accreditation, which will likely center around established
Standards and Practices and limit eligibility to organizations
incorporated for at least two years and with two completed conservation
projects. 260 Self-regulation ought to be considered and assessed before
outsiders impose a certification system.
3. Issues That Provide Room for Everybody - Even Academic Researchers
Three issues are pressing but, it seems, not yet ripe for
resolution. Discussions among practitioners, land trust members,
supporters, funders, government agencies, and even academics seem to
be called for in advance of making decisions.
Abuse Prevention-Certification and standards are not the only
fruitful approaches to preventing abuses in the land trust field. Several
states have rules that require approval of CEs or that limit new land
trusts from holding CEs for two to five years after they are organized. 261
This allows established land trusts to police newer ones and to assure
that they are appropriately situated to protect the public's interest in the
CEs. We believe that research on the effectiveness of these provisions
would be appropriate in advance of specific proposals.
Record Keeping -Recordation is another area that we need to
understand far better before adopting general recommendations. Our
much lamented watchful neighbor is unlikely to have been effective in
simply "remembering" the provisions of the complicated CE and is
further unlikely to have the skills to know what kind of baseline data
needs to be recorded with an easement. Ecologists and resource
managers must become more involved in defining standards for these
basic CE processes.
The other key element of recordation is to make sure that notice
of each CE is available to potential purchasers of the underlying fee,
planners, and citizens who want to know and exercise their rights. Again
this is an area in which states have adopted an interesting array of
approaches. California has a new and interesting law that needs to be
evaluated. This is key to tracking exacted CEs but is not limited to them.
Recordation is part of embedding the easement in the community and a

260. LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW VOLUNTARY LAND TRUST
ACCREDITATION PROGRAM (Oct. 2005), http://www.Ita.org/accreditation/accreditation.

pdf.
261. Sellers is among those who also argue that land trusts holding easements ought to
be required to demonstrate that they have a defense fund or endowment sufficient to
defend the conservation goals if they are challenged. Interview with William Sellers, supra
note 108.
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critical occasion for public involvement, comment, and local agency
262
review.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The NCCUSL achieved many of its goals for the UCEA. The Act
removed some elements of the common law that could have impeded
the use of CEs. Adopted in 22 states and the District of Columbia, the
UCEA has contributed to the growth of the land trust movement and
facilitated the use of CEs, and it has established a more consistent
vocabulary that practitioners, the courts, landowners, and the general
public can all use with some confidence.
Yet, in limiting the scope of the Act -regarding CEs as elements
of a private ordering system not appropriately subjected to public
oversight and scrutiny, except in narrowly circumscribed ways-the
drafting committee's perception of CEs did not accurately reflect the
public nature of CEs even at the time of their discussions. Federal
participation in the drafting process indicated that CEs were important
elements of public as well as private land conservation. 263 Nevertheless,
it may have been impossible for the NCCUSL to foresee and account for
the explosive growth in CE use; the rapid blurring and blending of
public and private funding, endeavors, and ownership; and the public
elements of CEs. And since the UCEA process, land trusts eager to
present themselves as a private, voluntary alternative to regulation have
embraced, amplified, and promoted the conception of CEs as within the
realm of private ordering.
But the private ordering view embodied in the UCEA and
perpetuated by many in the land trust movement misinterprets CEs. The
NCCUSL's insistence that CEs were part of a private ordering system
limited the scope of the UCEA but facilitated the widespread use and
acceptability of CEs. The private ordering idea has also resulted in
serious accountability problems for the land trust movement. The
increasingly public nature of CEs and CE transactions warrants a
reconsideration of the extent to which CEs and CE holders are
262. California's statute requires the recorder in each county to maintain, after January
1, 2002, "a comprehensive index of conservation easements and Notice of Conservation
Easements on land" within the county. CAL. GOv'T CODE § 27255 (West 2006). A second
registry bill would have required the Secretary of Resources to establish a publicly
available central registry of state-owned or funded conservation easements. S.B. 695, 20052006 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005). It was vetoed by the governor. Veto message (Oct. 7, 2005),
available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/sen/sb_0651-0700/sb_695-vt-20051007.
html. See Morris, supra note 240, at 19.
263.

See FAIRFAX ET AL., BUYING NATURE, supra note 1, at 191-92.
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conditioned by measures that ensure public oversight and
accountability.
An appropriate place to begin the discussion is by reorienting
the rhetoric regarding CEs and land trusts as private ordering.
Accounting for the public nature of CEs is central to clarifying easement
accountability and to considering the appropriate degree of public
oversight and access to information about CE negotiation, recordation,
amendment, monitoring, and enforcement. Basic elements of the
relationship between land trust programs and planning for both local
and federal land must still be clarified. Congressional and IRS oversight
provide remote measures of accountability for public expenditures, and
the charitable trust doctrine may provide appropriate public supervision
for modification and termination of easements that land trusts may want
to include explicitly in CE drafting. Indeed, as one ABA member noted,
establishing layers of public oversight may well "giv[e] added strength
to [easement holders'] enforcement efforts and protection against public
criticism[,]... strengthen charities' roles, and make a stronger case for
favorable income and property tax treatment." 264
Land trusts and CEs have been wounded as well as challenged
by the Washington Post's exposure of questionable practices on the part of
The Nature Conservancy. However, the solutions to most of these
problems are not obscure. The UCEA debates provide a reminder of the
limitations and potential alternatives to the Act. As the land trust
community confronts issues concerning rogue land trusts and CE abuse,
useful alternatives are buried in the debates of the NCCUSL, and many
others can be achieved by the organizations, particularly the LTA, that
have matured since the first UCEA was drafted. From 1975 to 1981, as
the NCCUSL was drafting the UCEA, the land trust movement played a
minor, if any, role in its formulation. Twenty-five years later, land trusts
have defined the contours of CEs and implemented the UCEA, exposing
its strengths and weaknesses and even contemplating its amendment. A
movement as energetic and creative as the land trust community is
effectively and appropriately tested by the questions that have been
raised, but neither the NCCUSL nor the Land Trust Alliance is likely to
make the same errors given a second chance.

264.

Letter from Albert B. Wolfe to John C. Deacon, supra note 137.

